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ABSTRACT 
Fifth Generation New Radio (5G NR) represents a shift in mobile telephony 
whereby the network architecture runs containerized software on commodity hardware. 
In preparation for this transition, numerous 4G Long Term Evolution software stacks 
have been developed to test the containerization of core network functions and the 
interfaces with radio access network protocols. In this thesis, one such stack, developed 
by the OpenAirInterface Software Alliance, was used to create a low-cost, simplified 
mobile network compatible with the Naval Operational Architecture. Commercial off-
the-shelf user equipment was then connected to the network to demonstrate how a buffer 
overflow vulnerability found in Qualcomm Global Navigation Satellite System chipsets 
and identified as CVE-2019-2254 can be leveraged to enable a spoofed network attack. 
The research also yielded an extension of the attack method to 5G NR networks.
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As the rollout of fifth generation (5G) of mobile telephony networks progresses, 
industry is already ramping up its research and development to transition from 5G New 
Radio (5G NR) to sixth generation (6G) mobile telephony. However, there is at least one 
technological gap in the R&D needed to support both the rollout of 5G and advancement 
of 6G technology. That gap is a dearth of R&D on managing cyber security risk pertaining 
to 5G networks. This thesis explores the identification of, classification of, and 
experimentation with 5G cyber-attack vectors. The thesis research resulted in the: creation 
and demonstration of the use of a scheme tailored specifically for classifying 5G attack 
vectors; development and demonstration of an apparatus and procedure for experimenting 
with a specific type of 5G attack vector; and recommendations for using the classification 
scheme, experimental apparatus and procedure to explore 5G attack vectors. 
The classification scheme introduced in this thesis involves mapping attack vectors 
based on their relationships to the 5G control and user plane split (CUPS). This scheme is 
a significant departure from what is typically used in the cyber security community. Instead 
of focusing on the attack method, the proposed classification scheme accounts for the 
network mechanisms utilized as the source and target of the attack. This thesis documents 
the scheme and its use in classifying attack vectors from fourth generation (4G) networks, 
some of which may be applicable to 5G networks because 5G inherits aspects of the 4G 
standard. The results of this part of the thesis were published in the April 2021 issue of the 
IEEE Computer Society Computer magazine.  
In order to advance the practice of security engineering for 5G network telephony, 
this thesis documents the development and demonstration of a new procedure for 
experimenting with a specific type of 5G attack vector. This part of the thesis research is 
based partially on the publicly disclosed security vulnerability referred to in the common 
vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) program catalog as CVE-2019-2254. The 
vulnerability is that an attacker can cause a buffer overflow to occur in certain global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS) chips manufactured by Qualcomm. The buffer 
overflow can then be used to execute arbitrary commands on the target cellular modem. 
xviii 
For instance, an attacker could covertly copy sensitive subscriber information such as the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment 
Identifier (IMEI), and encryption keys. The subscriber information can then be used by the 
attacker to pretend to be the target UE, eavesdrop on any communications to and from the 
user equipment (UE), or even force the target UE to attach to a spoofed mobile network. 
The EC20 modem produced by Quectel uses vulnerable Qualcomm GNSS chipsets 
identified in CVE-2019-2254. The modem is capable of operating in a variety of modes 
and cellular bands. While the EC20 is 4G capable, it is not capable of operating on 
standalone 5G networks. Although significant differences exist between 4G and 5G 
networks, these differences are transparent to the attack vector identified. The spoofed 
mobile network attack vector serves as the case study for this thesis. 
The apparatus used in this thesis for experimentation with the attack vector is an 
open stack 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. We created this network from a single 
UE (the EC20) connected via SMA cables to an eNodeB (eNB) and an evolved packet core 
(EPC). The eNB and EPC utilize open-source software from the OpenAirInterface (OAI) 
Software Alliance (OSA)—a French non-profit organization that develops cellular Radio 
Access Network (RAN) and Core Network (CN) solutions in conjunction with commercial 
and academic entities. Some member organizations include: Eurecom, Qualcomm, 
Facebook Connectivity, Fujitsu, Xilinx, Inmarsat, Nokia Bell Labs, Rutgers Wireless 
Information Network Laboratory, Rice University, and Fraunhofer. This thesis research 
uses code from the OSA 4G LTE RAN and 4G EPC repositories. The eNB also utilizes a 
radio front-end from National Instruments, the Universal Software Radio Peripheral 
(USRP) B200. 
In addition to the open stack 4G LTE network, we configured a universal integrated 
circuit card (UICC) for use in testing the attack vector. This involved a detailed study of 
the UICCs, including file systems, applications, commands, and reading and writing data. 
Both 4G and 5G UICCs contain a Java-based application called a universal subscriber 
identity module (USIM). An important element in getting the USIM to work within the 
experimental setting was to configure service flags within the USIM to show that the user 
is provisioned for 5G service. However, those same memory locations are used to store 
xix 
information such as the IMSI and cryptography keys. The implication here is that 5G UEs, 
despite improvements in the authentication and keying agreement (AKA) procedure and 
protection of subscription permanent identifiers (SUPI), will still be vulnerable to the 
identified attack vector. The UICC contains additional resources that are used by mobile 
network operators (MNO) to provide applications for billing, or by third-party vendors to 
provide services such as mobile banking. Once the attacker gains initial access to the UICC, 
additional applications can be loaded to maintain a persistent presence on the target device. 
Experimentation with the 4G network resulted in key parameters and utilities being 
identified, integrated, and used within the setup of the open stack network. 
The results from experimentation indicate that the open stack network concept is 
low-cost, flexible, and scalable to meet the demands of both network users and security 
researchers. In particular, the 4G LTE open stack network was utilized to explore how 
CVE-2019-2254 could be exploited on the Quectel EC20 modem. While the OSA is 
developing software for 5G RAN and CN, the 5G software did not reach maturity in time 
for incorporation into this thesis. However, the underlying concepts and many of the 
commands and utilities demonstrated in this thesis will be similar for the 5G software.  
Through exploration with the open stack network, the constructs for a spoofed 
network attack vector were developed. The identified attack vector expands the scope of 
false base station attacks to reveal the possibility of spoofed networks. Additional utilities 
are required to form a spoofed network with full-service capabilities, such as a simple 
message service center (SMSC) and integration with MNO phone number registries. 
Furthermore, the UICC read and write utilities required for configuring subscriber 
information in the USIM application provides a steppingstone for additional research into 
the security mechanisms for protecting subscriber information in the UE. Finally, the utility 
of the mobile telephony attack vector taxonomy published in Computer magazine was 
validated as this research chained multiple vulnerabilities together to expose inherent 
weaknesses in UICCs in the context of 4G and 5G networks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 5th generation (5G) of mobile telephony standards, like the 4th generation (4G) 
before it, will require precision timing which can be provided by GNSS constellations or 
transported between nodes via Partial Timing Support (PTS) or Full Timing Support (FTS). 
In order to provide timing redundancy and resiliency, some modem deployments will 
include global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers. Due to the prevalence of 
GNSS chipsets in mobile devices and a limited set of manufacturers, a single security 
vulnerability in a GNSS receiver chip could disproportionately affect numerous models 
and generations of cellular modems. 
On July 2, 2019, an article released by the Center for Internet Security warned of 
multiple vulnerabilities found within the Google Android operating system (OS) that could 
be used by an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a target device [1]. In addition to OS-
level vulnerabilities, several component-level vulnerabilities were detailed for Qualcomm 
chips. One of the Qualcomm component vulnerabilities is common vulnerabilities and 
exposures (CVE) -2019-2254 which received a 9.8 out of 10, that is “critical,” severity 
rating using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) version 3.x criteria [2], 
[3]. The vulnerability description states that “position accuracy may be degraded due to 
wrongly decoded information.” An additional vulnerability is CVE-2018-13887 which also 
received a 9.8 out of 10 rating [4]. In this vulnerability, certain Qualcomm modems could 
experience integer overflows through untrusted header fields in the GNSS XTRA3 
function. 
Both vulnerabilities affect similar Qualcomm modem product lines through GNSS 
components and could be used to conduct buffer overflow attacks to execute arbitrary code 
on the target device. The severity of these vulnerabilities led us to ask the following 
questions: 
• Are GNSS chipsets required components for 4G or 5G-capable cellular 
telephones? 
• What GNSS chipsets or capabilities exist in the current cellphone market? 
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• Can CVE-2019-2254 or CVE-2018-13887 be used in 4G or 5G networks? 
Given that the Navy is interested in 5G technology, instead of just focusing on these 
two vulnerabilities it is prudent to understand how the vulnerabilities fit into the bigger 
picture: What are the categories of attack vectors for 5G communications? Answering this 
question led to the construction of an attack vector categorization scheme [5]. This 
taxonomy utilizes the control and user plane separation (CUPS) in the 5G NR architecture 
to provide an alternative method for analyzing mobile telephony attack vectors. 
In this thesis, we further investigated the vulnerabilities announced in CVE-2018-
13887 and CVE-2019-2254. To support the research, we constructed an open stack 4G 
LTE network. The open stack network utilizes open-source software running on 
commodity hardware to provide a low-cost, scalable, and adaptable platform for use in 
security research. Beyond providing accessibility to academics and security researchers, 
the open stack network could also provide key communications infrastructure that 
interfaces with the Naval Operational Architecture [6], [7]. 
While setting-up the open stack network, we developed a spoofed network attack 
that builds upon the false base station attack used against legacy networks. This attack 
vector leverages the security vulnerabilities in the GNSS chipset to execute modem-level 
commands and exfiltrate sensitive subscriber information and cryptography keys. With this 
information, the attacker could force the target mobile device to attach to the spoofed 
network. If the spoofed network parameters are configured to mirror legitimate commercial 
networks and sufficient services are implemented, the attacker could covertly copy, filter, 
or alter traffic to and from the mobile device. Some aspects of this proposed attack vector 
remain for future work; however, the key concepts of modem-level commands to discover 
subscriber information and forcibly attach a target device to the spoofed network are 
demonstrated in this work. 
The remainder of this thesis consists of five chapters: background, equipment and 
network set-up, spoofed network attack theory, results, and conclusions and 
recommendations for follow-on research, respectively.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter includes material adapted from work to be published by the author. 
Specifically, Sections II.A.2, II.A.3, and II.B.3 contain some revised material from 
“Spoofed Networks: Exploitation of GNSS Security Vulnerability in 4G and 5G Mobile 
Networks” by Matthew J. Lanoue, James Bret Michael, and Chad A. Bollmann, to be 
published in the 2021 International Symposium on Performance Evaluation of Computer 
and Telecommunication Systems. 
 4G/5G FUNDAMENTALS 
1. Historical Overview 
Mobile telephony has advanced from the analog first-generation technologies of 
the 1980s such as Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS), Total Access Communication 
System (TACS), and Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT), retroactively labeled 1G, to 
delivering a fifth-generation standard, 5G New Radio (5G NR or 5G), in the 2020s. 
Currently, 4G LTE is the global. 
Mobile telephony standards are created and maintained by the Third Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP), an international standards organization that has overseen the 
development and maintenance of mobile standards since 2G. 3GPP standards are 
consolidated into a release that governs multiple features or aspects of mobile telephony. 
Release 8 in 2008 was the first release that covered 4G LTE. Release 15 in 2018 is the first 
step in defining the 5G New Radio (NR) standard. It is important to note that although 5G 
is currently the most cutting-edge technology, the majority of the mobile telephone market 
is still dominated by 4G technology, as shown in Figure 1. As a result, newer standards 
must incorporate some degree of backwards compatibility. 
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 Global Mobile Telephone Market Share by Technology. 
Source: [8]. 
While there are currently over 3 billion 2G and 3G devices, many mobile network 
operators (MNOs) are starting to shutdown these legacy networks. In the United States, 
AT&T led the way in 2017 by decommissioning its 2G network [9]. AT&T announced its 
intention to shut down its 3G network service in early 2022 [10]. Verizon will sunset its 
3G code division multiple access (CDMA) network at the end of 2022 [11]. Security 
researchers must upgrade their mobile telephony hardware to more modern 4G and 5G set-
ups or risk losing market share. 
2. 4G LTE Architecture and Overview 
LTE (Long Term Evolution) was designed to improve upon 3G by incorporating 
spectrum flexibility in the form of utilizing unpaired and paired channels via Frequency-
Division Duplex (FDD) and Time-Division Duplex (TDD), respectively [12]. LTE uses 
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) to transmit multiple symbols per 
subframe. At a high level, the 4G network architecture contains a capable user equipment 
(UE), the Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), and the Evolved 
Packet Core (EPC). The E-UTRAN consists of multiple eNodeB, which are evolved base 
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stations that combine the functions of the Base Station (BS) and Radio Network Controller 
(RNC) from the 3G standard. Figure 2 depicts the major parts of a 4G network architecture. 
 
 4G Network Architecture. Source: [13]. 
In the core network (CN), the home subscriber server (HSS) contains subscriber 
information such as the IMSI and master key associated with each user. The mobility 
management entity (MME) controls the security and mobility of all UEs attached to the 
network and acts as an intermediary between the UE and HSS during the authentication 
and key agreement (AKA) process. The serving gateway (S-GW) routes data between the 
RAN and the packet data network (PDN). The PDN gateway (P-GW) allocates IP 
addresses to UEs attached to the network and communicates with external data networks 
over the SGi interface. 
3. 5G Architecture and Overview 
5G NR is designed to incorporate three primary usage cases: enhanced mobile 
broadband (eMBB), massive machine-type communication (mMTC), and ultra-reliable 
low-latency communication (URLLC). Each of the usage cases has its own set of 
requirements and is used to simplify the creation of technical specifications, and there may 
be actual usage requirements that do not fit neatly within one of the three primary usage 
cases. Some key enhancements provided by 5G include operation in higher frequency 
bands—including mm-wave frequencies, minimizing the overhead associated with 
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“always-on” signals, flexible subcarrier spacing, and channel-dependent scheduling. 5G 
also uses OFDM, with various TDD and FDD channelization schemes.  
5G NR network architecture, like 4G LTE, contains a RAN and CN. Figure 3 shows 
a basic 5G network with a detailed insert for some of the most relevant core network 
functions, and Figure 4 shows a more complex RAN with a disaggregated next-generation 
base station (gNB). In the 5G core network, the EPC is expanded to included service-based 
architecture, support for network slicing, and a functionality split between the control plane 
and user plane. Additionally, network functionality is split across a larger number of 
network functions than in the 4G EPC. Within the RAN, gNodeB (gNB) and ng-eNodeB 
(ng-eNB) can connect to the 5G core network. The difference between the two types of 
nodes is that the gNB is used for NR devices via the 5G user and control-plane protocols, 
while the ng-eNB is used for LTE devices via the 4G user- and control-plane protocols. 
Figure 5 shows several RAN options used for 4G and 5G networks, where the “c” 
represents the control-plane link and the “u” represents the user-plane link. Option 1 is a 
standard 4G RAN, option 2 is a 5G standalone (SA) RAN, and option 3 is a 5G non-
standalone (NSA) RAN. 
For comparison with 4G EPC network functions, we briefly review the User Plane 
function (UPF), Session Management function (SMF), Access and Mobility Management 
function (AMF), Unified Data Management (UDM), and Authentication Server function 
(AUSF). The UPF routes data between the RAN and external data networks. The SMF 
allocates IP addresses to the UE, conducts traffic steering at the UPF, and enforces network 
policies. The AMF is responsible for control signaling with the device and RAN, including 
connection, registration, and mobility management. The AUSF supports authentication for 
network access using credentials and subscription information stored in the UDM. 
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 5G Network Architecture. Source: [12]. 
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 5G Radio Access Network. Source: [12]. 
 
 4G and 5G RAN Configurations. Source: [12]. 
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4. User Equipment and Base Station Link 
The link between the UE and BS, whether it is an eNB or gNB is called the UU 
link. Starting in the 3G standard, this link has been encrypted. For each generation of 
standards, the UU link has a series of technical specifications that cover the acceptable 
frequency deviation and synchronization times. The frequency deviation specification 
shown in Table 1 covers 3G, 4G, and 5G. 
Table 1. Base Station Frequency Deviation Specifications 
Base Station Class Required Accuracy 
Wide Area BS +/- 0.05 ppm 
Medium Range BS +/- 0.1 ppm 
Local Area BS +/- 0.1 ppm 
Home BS (not in 5G standard) +/- 0.25 ppm 
Adapted from [14], [15], and [16]. 
 
In the 4G and 5G standards, a time alignment error (TAE) is defined as the average 
frame timing difference between any two transmitters on different transmit antenna 
connections [15], [16]. The maximum permitted TAE for 4G and 5G is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Time Alignment Error Specification 
Operating Mode 4G LTE 5G NR 
MIMO or Transmitter Diversity ≤ 65 nsec ≤ 65 nsec 
Intra-band contiguous carrier aggregation ≤ 130 nsec ≤ 260 nsec 
Intra-band non-contiguous carrier aggregation ≤ 260 nsec ≤ 3 μsec 
Inter-band carrier aggregation ≤ 260 nsec ≤ 3 μsec 
Adapted from [15] and [16]. 
 
Additionally, some services provided by the base station can utilize GNSS or provide 
services that complement GNSS. For example, the 3G standard employs TDD Node B 
synchronization ports, where at least one Node B in each cell is synchronized by an external 
reference such as GPS [17]. In 4G, the LTE Positioning Protocol (LPP) is used by a UE to 
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determine its location through position-related measurements on one or more reference sensors 
[18], [19]. Finally, 5G specifies requirements for Assisted-GNSS (A-GNSS), which reduce the 
time to first fix by providing the UE with satellite ephemeris data [20]. 
 TIMING BASICS 
1. Synchronization Methods 
a. Network Time Protocol 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a one-way clock synchronization protocol capable 
of maintaining time within a few milliseconds. It has numerous software implementations 
such as Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP), Windows Time, and chrony. 
b. Precision Time Protocol 
Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a two-way clock synchronization protocol 
capable of maintaining timing accuracy less than 15 nanoseconds. It employs the best 
master clock (BMC) algorithm to determine which clock source to select for a particular 
domain and network segment. PTP is widely implemented in routers, switches, integrated 
circuits, standalone solutions, and software stacks. 
c. Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
GNSS broadcast timing messages over the air that can be used to maintain timing 
accuracy within 15 nanoseconds. Additionally, GNSS can be used to determine the location 
of a receiver. GNSSs are discussed further in Section II.C. 
2. Types of Synchronization 
Synchronization is a necessary part of any communications system. The receiver 
must be able to determine and compensate for differences between design and reality. 
These include frequency offsets, phase offsets, and time offsets. Figure 6 illustrates the 
different types of offsets, and the possible effects. Different communications systems 
require different levels of synchronization to function properly. 
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 Types of Synchronization 
Two nodes that have achieved frequency synchronization exhibit the same time 
delay between matching points of the signal. Frequency synchronization compensates for 
Doppler shift between nodes and any instabilities or inaccuracies in oscillators. Although 
the nodes are synchronized in frequency, they are not necessarily synchronized in time or 
phase. Examples of standards that can provide frequency synchronization include E1/T1, 
SyncE, PTP, NTP, GNSS, 10 MHz, and 1PPS. 
Phase synchronization is then established when the two nodes receive information 
at the same instant in time, but not referenced to a common epoch. Frequency 
synchronization must be established before phase synchronization can occur. PTP, NTP, 
1PPS, and GNSS can also be used to establish phase synchronization. 
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Finally, time synchronization is achieved after frequency and phase 
synchronization when information is referenced to a common epoch. Standards that can 
achieve time synchronization are NTP, PTP, and GNSS. 
3. Evolution to GNSS Functionality in Cellular Chips 
Major chipmakers produce modems for 4G and 5G that can be purchased as an 
individual circuit chip, or part of an integrated system on a chip (SoC) solution. Figure 7 
shows the components within a Qualcomm radio frequency front end (RFFE) solution used 
in the Snapdragon line of modems and processors. A SoC solution, such as the Snapdragon 
system-in-package solution shown in Figure 8, typically includes an RFFE, various filters, 
and interfaces to external devices and features such as WiFi or GNSS. A brief analysis of 
5G products available in the marketplace, shown in Figure 8, reveals the prevalence of 
GNSS functionality in commercial SoC solutions. 
 
 Qualcomm Radio Frequency Front-End Structure. 
Adapted from [21]. 
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 Qualcomm Snapdragon Functionality. Source: [22]. 
Table 3. Market Analysis of 5G SoC 
Company Product Line GNSS? Constellations & Freq Bands 
Huawei Kirin 980 Yes GPS, Glonass, BeiDou 
MediaTek Dimensity 1000 series Yes not specified 
MediaTek Dimensity 820 series Yes GPS, Glonass, BeiDou, Galileo 
Quectel RG500Q Yes GPS, Glonass, BeiDou, Galileo, QZSS 
Samsung Exynos 980 Yes GPS, Glonass, BeiDou, Galileo, QZSS, NavIC 
Samsung Exynos 1080 Yes GPS, Glonass, BeiDou, Galileo 
Samsung Exynos 2100 No N/A 
Sierra 
Wireless EM9190 Yes GPS (band L1 and L5), Galileo, Glonass, Beidou 
Sierra 
Wireless EM9191 Yes GPS (band L1 and L5), Galileo, Glonass, Beidou 
Telit FN980 Yes GPS (band L1 and L5) 
Telit FN980m Yes GPS (band L1 and L5) 
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 GNSS AND PNT 
1. History and Overview 
The discovery of electromagnetic waves by Maxwell and subsequent 
demonstration of wireless communications by Marconi have fascinated scientists and 
scholars alike. By the end of World War II, the United Kingdom and United States had 
both developed radio navigation systems. Gee, the U.K. system, was accurate to a few 
hundred meters and covered a range of approximately 350 miles. LORAN (an abbreviation 
for long range navigation) was designed by the U.S. to cover a large portion of the Atlantic 
Ocean. It was accurate to tens of miles and covered a range of approximately 1500 miles. 
In the 1960s, the U.S. deployed the first satellite navigation system, known as 
Transit. The primary purpose of this system, also referred to as NAVSAT, was to provide 
location services for ballistic missile submarines during the Cold War. Satellite coverage 
was not complete, however, and the quality of the positioning afforded by the system 
depended on the ability of the receiver to accurately measure the Doppler shift of the 
satellite. 
The GNSS were launched in 1978 and 1982 by the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
respectively. The Global Positioning System (GPS), created by the U.S., achieved global 
coverage in 1994. Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) 
achieved global coverage for the Russian Federation in 1995. Since then, two other GNSS 
systems have been launched: BeiDou by the People’s Republic of China in 2000, and 
Galileo by the European Union in 2011. BeiDou achieved continuous global coverage on 
23 June 2020. Galileo is scheduled to achieve continuous global coverage in 2021 after an 
additional two satellite vehicles complete on-orbit testing [23]. 
In addition to global navigation satellite systems, regional navigation satellite 
systems (RNSS) exist to provide a localized PNT solution. Two RNSS are currently 
deployed, Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC) covers India and Quasi-Zenith 
Satellite System (QZSS) covers the Japanese islands. Further augmentation of GNSS 
constellations can be accomplished via satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS), 
ground-based augmentation systems (GBAS), or aircraft-based augmentation systems 
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(ABAS). Some examples of SBAS include Wide Area Augmentation System, Differential 
GPS, and Multifunctional Satellite Augmentation System. A map of SBAS coverage for 
various parts of the world is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 Global Coverage of Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS). Source: [24]. 
GNSS offers three major services to users: positioning, navigation, and timing 
(PNT). The timing accuracy of the GNSS constellations is particularly useful in modern 
applications such as banking, networking, manufacturing, and communications. 
Augmentations to the GNSS are designed to improve positioning accuracy, reduce the 
amount of time required to obtain the first satellite fix, or make the PNT services more 
resilient by incorporating multiple GNSS constellations. 
2. Theory of Operations 
GNSS receivers determine their three-dimensional location through trilateration. 
To unambiguously determine the location of the receiver, the receiver must also 
compensate for clock offset at the receiver. The receiver, therefore, must solve a set of four 
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equations with four unknown variables (one for each of the three-dimensions of position, 
and another for local clock offset). Thus, one of the requirements for a GNSS constellation 
is that the satellite orbits are designed such that at least four of the satellites are observable 
by any receiver at any time. The receiver calculates the distance, d, to each of four satellites 
in the GNSS constellation using the speed of light and the amount of time it took for the 
signal to travel from the satellite to the receiver, τ, as shown in (1). 
 d c τ= ×  (1) 
The sequence transmitted by each satellite must be known so that it can be 
compared to a local copy at the receiver. The sequence also must be sufficiently long so 
that it does not repeat within the amount of time the signal propagates from the satellite to 
Earth. 
3. Global Positioning System 
The United States began launching satellites for the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) in February 1978. The constellation of 24 satellites was completed in 1993. Since 
then, additional satellites have been launched to replace failing satellites and improve the 
precision of the constellation by adding transmission capability in the L5 band. Today, the 
GPS constellation contains on-orbit spares in addition to the 24 satellites required for PNT.  
The satellites are divided into six orbital planes with an inclination of 55° and are 
offset by 60° in the right ascension of the ascending node (RAAN) from one another. Each 
orbital plane contains four satellites in medium Earth orbit (MEO) at approximately 20,200 
km altitude. The satellites are not evenly spaced within each orbital plane but organized so 
that at least six satellites are in the line of sight to any receiver on Earth at any given time. 
Each satellite transmits a unique pseudo random noise (PRN) code, which allows 
the receiver to distinguish between satellites. For the L1 coarse acquisition (C/A) code, the 
PRN sequence is 1023 bits long. The atomic clock onboard each satellite creates a reliable 
signal at 10.23 MHz which is used to generate the C/A code at 1.023 Mbps. As a result, 
the C/A code repeats every 1 millisecond. 
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The PRN code is generated by summing two generator polynomials, one of which 
is delayed by a number of chips unique to each satellite, to create a Gold code (after Robert 
Gold), as shown in Figure 10. The delay value, n, used for each satellite is given in 
Appendix A. Alternatively, taps from the linear feedback shift register can be used instead 
of a delay block. The required taps for each satellite are also given in the appendix. The 
Gold codes are designed so that any two codes have approximately no cross-correlation 
and that each code is almost uncorrelated with itself except at zero lag. 
 
 PRN Code Generation for GPS Satellites 
Once generated, the Gold code is XORed with navigation data and used to modulate 
the L1 carrier frequency via binary phase shift keying (BPSK). Navigation data is 
transmitted on the L1 frequency at 50 bits per second and consists of five 300-bit subframes 
that each last 6 seconds. The last two subframes contain satellite almanac data that is cycled 
over 25 frames before it is repeated. Altogether, the navigation data repeats every 12.5 
minutes. The navigation data structure is shown in Figure 11. 
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 GPS Navigation Data Frame Structure. Source: [25]. 
Each subframe contains telemetry data (TLM) and a handover word (HOW). 
Subframe one includes clock information used to determine when the navigation message 
was transmitted by the satellite. Subframe two and three include orbital information for the 
transmitting satellite that is used in position calculation. Subframes four and five contain 
ephemeris data for all the GPS satellites in service, but at reduced precision. 
Another code, the encrypted P(Y) code is generated and XORed with the navigation 
data. The result is also used to modulate the L1 carrier via BPSK, however, this resultant 
constellation is orthogonal to the C/A code constellation. The two signals are transmitted 
together on the L1 carrier frequency. All GPS satellites transmit the C/A and P(Y) codes 
on L1 and P(Y) again on L2. Block IIF and newer GPS satellites transmit a new signal on 
L5 consisting of an in-phase and quadrature-phase code, I5 and Q5, respectively. Block III 
satellites transmit the L1C signal, which is designed to be backward compatible with the 
C/A code, as well as a military (M) code on L1 and L2.
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4. Major Systems Comparison 
Table 4 compares the capabilities of the various GNSS and RNSS constellations 
currently in service. The precision of each system depends on a variety of factors, including 
which of the frequency bands are being utilized (public or encrypted), receiver tolerances, 
atmospheric conditions, and the use of multiple constellations or external timing 
corrections.
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Table 4. GNSS and RNSS Comparison 
System Host(s) Satellite Parameters Frequency Bands Channel 
Access 





4 per 6 orbital planes 
6 additional orbiting spares 
L1 1.57542 GHz 
L2 1.22760 GHz 
L5 1.17645 GHz 
CDMA 20,180 km 2 
GLONASS Russia 24 MEO 
8 per 3 orbital planes 
G1 1.593–1.610 GHz  
G2 1.237–1.254 GHz 
G3 1.189–1.214 GHz  
CDMA & 
FDMA 
19,130 km 17/8 
BeiDou China 24 MEO, 3 IGSO, 1 GSO B1/B1-2 1.561098/1.589742 GHz 
B2 1.20714 GHz  
B3 1.26852 GHz 




8 per 3 orbital planes 
6 additional orbiting spares 
E1 1.57542 GHz 
E5 1.191795 GHz 
E6 1.27875 GHz 
CDMA 23,222 km 17/10 
QZSS Japan 3 GSO, 1 GEO L1C/A,L1C,L1S 1.57542 GHz  
L2C 1.22760 GHz 
L5,L5S 1.17645 GHz 
CDMA 32,600 - 
39,000 km 
1 
NavIC India 3 GEO, 5 GSO MEO L5 1.17645 GHz 
S 2.492028 GHz 
CDMA 36,000 km 1 
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5. Multi-constellation Receivers and Real-Time Kinematics 
Using a single frequency from a GNSS constellation can have long acquisition 
times. To solve this problem, many receivers implement additional features, such as pulling 
almanac data from other sources, using two or more frequency bands to improve location 
resolution, or using multiple GNSS constellations. As discussed in Section II.A.4, GNSS 
receivers are used in conjunction with mobile telephony services such as A-GNSS or LPP. 
Another way to improve the resolution of GNSS constellations is to use carrier-
phase enhancement to perform real-time kinematic positioning (RTK). By tracking 
changes in the phase of the carrier signal (at roughly 1 GHz) rather than the overlayed data 
signal (at roughly 1 MHz), centimeter-level precision can be obtained by specially 
equipped receivers. This technology will play an important part in autonomous vehicles 
and their communications via vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-everything protocols. 
 UNIVERSAL INTEGRATED CIRCUIT CARDS 
The subscriber information for mobile devices is stored on a universal integrated 
circuit card (UICC). The UICC contains an integrated circuit that runs applications 
programmed using the Java Smart Card toolkit. Subscriber information is stored within the 
SIM application for 2G networks or the USIM application for networks starting with 3G. 
Additional applications include billing, mobile banking, and additional storage for phone 
numbers or text messages.  
Within the USIM application, there are several dedicated files (DF) stored as offsets 
from the master file (MF). A DF may contain sub-directories, elementary files (EF) where 
information is stored, and application dedicated files (ADF) which are DFs related to a 
specific application. An EF can take several forms: 
• Transparent: a fixed sequence of bytes 
• Linear fixed: a sequence of up to 255 records 
• Cyclic: a sequence of records where the last record is linked back to the 
first record 
22 
• Tag length value: a record containing a tag, length, and value 
Certain DFs and EFs are mandatory within the USIM application and have 
specified memory locations, while other locations are reserved for usage by the UICC 
manufacturer or MNO. Section 4.7 of [26] contains two figures that depict the file structure 
of the UICC and USIM ADF (ADFUSIM), respectively. Figure 12 shows the UICC MF, EFs 
at the MF level, and some of the DFs. A list of applications loaded onto the UICC can be 
obtained by reading the records stored in EFDIR. The UICC integrated circuit card 
identification number (ICCID) is stored in EFICCID. The ADFUSIM file system (not shown) 
contains EFs with the information such as the subscriber’s IMSI, cryptographic keys, and 
mobile subscriber integrated services digital network (ISDN) number (MSISDN). 
23 
 
 Overview of UICC MF Structure. Source: [26].
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Each file in ADFUSIM has a set of access conditions for reading, writing, activating, 
or deactivating. For a given EF, the access conditions for each action tend to differ. The 
access conditions have levels zero through seven as described in Table 5. An example of 
the access conditions and structure listed in [26] for EFs is provided in Table 6 for the 
Access Point Name Control List EF (EFACL). 
Table 5. USIM Access Conditions. Adapted from [27]. 
Level Access Condition Description 
0 ALW The associated action is always allowed 
1 PIN Pin level 1 must be verified to perform the action 
2 PIN2 Pin level 2 must be verified to perform the action 
3,4 RFU Permission levels set aside for future use 
5,6 ADM Administrator pin required 
7 NEV The associated action is never allowed 
 
Table 6. EF for Access Point Name Control List. Adapted from 
[26]. 
Identifier: ‘6F57’ Structure: transparent Optional 
File size: X bytes (X>1) Update activity: low 
Access Conditions: 
 READ                         PIN 
 UPDATE                    PIN2 
 DEACTIVATE           ADM 
 ACTIVATE             ADM 
 
Bytes Description M/O Length 
1  Number of APNs/DNNs M 1 byte 




III. EQUIPMENT AND NETWORK SETUP 
This chapter details the hardware and software utilized, and the various network 
topologies employed, during the phased implementation of an open stack network. First, 
the UE rationale and capabilities are discussed. Then, the open stack network is introduced, 
to include selection of software and hardware, available software utilities, and network 
topologies employed. A detailed description of the steps required to attach the UE to the 
open stack network is given, which includes subscriber credential provisioning, network 
provisioning, and execution of modem-level commands. Finally, an overview of some 
additional software used throughout the work is provided. 
 QUECTEL EC20 
The COTS modem selected for this thesis was the EC20 model from Chinese 
telecommunications company Quectel. This modem product line is LTE capable and is 
advertised for machine-to-machine and Internet of Things applications. Figure 13 shows a 
Quectel EC20 modem without the protective metal covering over the internal modem 
components. At the top of the image are three connectors for the main, GNSS, and receiver 
diversity antennas. Figure 14 displays the EC20 modem used for this thesis housed in a 
developer board with adapters connected to the antenna ports. The developer board 
facilitates communications between the modem and a host computer via USB. 
Additionally, the developer board provides interfaces for microphones and headphones to 
operate with the modem. 
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 Quectel EC20 Modem in Developer Board 
1. Modem Selection Rationale 
The EC20-CE modem was chosen as our COTS UE for several reasons. Most 
importantly, the EC20 product line contains Qualcomm chips identified in the GNSS and 
component-level vulnerabilities discussed in [1]–[4]. While EC20 regional variants and 
revisions contain different Qualcomm chips, including the MDM9215, MDM9615, or 
MDM9607, these chips are all vulnerable to multiple component-level CVEs. The variant 
chosen, the EC20-CE, contains additional provisions in the firmware to region lock the 
device to China and India. The use of international bands not deployed in the United States 
enabled wireless testing of the device without interfering with commercial networks. 
Secondarily, the EC20 modem is low-cost at $50. Several were already available 
from previous projects. This ensured that the project would not stall if a few modems were 
destroyed during the component identification or configuration. Additionally, with several 
modems available, a network could be configured with multiple UEs to test functionality 
such as phone calls over voice or data circuits, text messaging, and data transfer. 
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2. Device Specifications 
The variant used in this thesis was the EC20-CE in a miniPCIe form factor inserted 
into a Quectel developer board. The LTE frequency bands in which the modem can operate 
differed from those provided in several manufacturer brochures, likely due to changes in 
regional variant and device revisions. The actual capabilities of the modem were found by 
executing the command:  
AT+QENG=“band” 
The result was then parsed to determine the LTE frequency bands in which the modem can 
operate as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Quectel EC20-CE 4G LTE Frequency Band Capability 
LTE Band Mode f [MHz] 
1 FDD 2100 
3 FDD 1800 
5 FDD 850 
7 FDD 2600 
8 FDD 900 
20 FDD 800 
38 TDD 2600 
39 TDD 1900 
40 TDD 2300 
41 TDD 2500 
 
Additional device specifications of note include capability for 2x2 multiple-input 
and multiple-output (MIMO) on the downlink, GNSS services, and compliance with the 
3GPP release 9 of the LTE standard. Due to the single transmit antenna and the 2x2 MIMO 
receiver capability, the EC20 is capable of up to 50 Mbps on the uplink and 100 Mbps on 
the downlink [29]. A more detailed listing of the EC20 revision 1 and revision 2.1 modem 
capabilities is provided in Appendix C. An exhaustive list of EC20 revision 2.1 hardware 
specifications, including supported protocols, power transmission capabilities, and 
functional and circuit diagrams is given in [30]. 
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3. Hardware Teardown 
Several sources have performed a hardware teardown of the EC20 product to 
identify the internal components used by Quectel for any additional vulnerabilities, 
including [28] and [31]. Although differences exist in the Qualcomm chip used for the 
modem, as discussed in section III.A.1, the chips all come from similar product lines with 
similar vulnerabilities. These differences are likely the result of regional variants and 
hardware revisions to the EC20 modem. Figure 15 labels the major components within an 
EC20 modem and gives their functional role. The EC20 modem shown in Figure 13 is 
likely a revision 1 device, while the modem in Figure 15 is likely a revision 2.0 or 2.1 
device. 
 
 Hardware Teardown of EC20 Modem. Source: [31]. 
Figure 16 adapts a functional block diagram for the EC20 revision 2.1 modem to 
highlight how the integrated circuits identified during the hardware teardown interoperate. 
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The colors match between the two figures to facilitate comparison. Notably, the transmitter 
and receiver radio frequency front-end (RFFE) shown in a dark blue box in Figure 15 is 
indicated by a dashed dark blue box in Figure 16. 
 
 EC20 Modem Functional Diagram. Adapted from [30]. 
4. Software Teardown 
The EC20 modem runs the factory firmware and a minimal Linux distribution 
based on the 3.18.20 kernel. Previous collaborative efforts between the NPS Electrical and 
Computer Engineering and Computer Science departments succeeded in pulling some of 
the system firmware. While most of these files are binaries that include Qualcomm 
proprietary code for the modem chip, the “strings” utility was able to pull some human-
readable information from the files. This includes portions of the software used to load the 
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Qualcomm drivers and some additional modem-level commands not listed in any of the 
Quectel documentation. 
5. Vulnerability Analysis 
As previously discussed, multiple component-level vulnerabilities have been 
identified that could affect the EC20 modem. Each of the CVE reports for these 
component-level vulnerabilities were analyzed to determine the severity of the 
vulnerability and whether the EC20 modem was affected. Of the 21 vulnerabilities 
analyzed, seven had a criticality rating of 9.8, which corresponds to “critical.” Each of 
these “critical” vulnerabilities affected both the MDM9207 and MDM9607 series chips 
except that CVE-2019-2276 did not affect the MDM9207 product line. Appendix B 
contains information for all 21 CVEs. Further research into Qualcomm component-level 
vulnerabilities related to GNSS functionality could reveal additional vulnerabilities that 
remain unpatched in the software installed on the EC20.  
The high severity rating for CVE-2019-2254 provides reason to believe that 
“position accuracy may be degraded” is an understatement of the possible effects of 
exploiting the vulnerability. The other part of the vulnerability description, “wrongly 
decoded information,” could refer to either malformed information from spoofed GNSS 
signals or external almanac files. 
 OPEN STACK NETWORK 
An open stack network leverages commodity hardware and open-source software 
to provide a tool or testbed that is low-cost, easy to upgrade, and flexible. As mobile 
telephony standards progress, open stack networks can be upgraded by patching the 
software. Additionally, the network can be reprogrammed to offer more or fewer of the 
services described in the 3GPP standards. If the open stack network were to be operated 
outside of a Faraday cage, spectrum access would be required. 
1. Hardware Selection Rationale 
Since the open stack network concept should not require any specialized hardware, 
three modern laptops were obtained to run the CN, RAN, and UE. The laptops were 
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identical HP ProBook 640 G1s with Intel Core i7 processors and 16 GB of random-access 
memory running the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system. The processor in each laptop contains 
four physical cores divided into two logical cores each via hyperthreading for a total of 
eight cores. 
For radio frequency communications, two Universal Software Radio Peripheral 
(USRP) B200 devices from Ettus Research were utilized. These software-defined radios 
(SDR) can be configured to operate from 70 MHz up to 6 GHz and cover 56 MHz of 
bandwidth. USB3 connectivity allows high data transfer rates to and from the device. 
Furthermore, the USRP B200 contains a reprogrammable Spartan6 FPGA that can be used 
to configure parts of the digital signal processing chain on the SDR. The USRP B200s 
utilized contain an add-on GPSDO module to provide precision timing, if needed. Full 
technical specifications for the USRP B200 are provided in Appendix D. 
2. Software Selection Rationale 
Various open source 4G networking projects were considered for use in this thesis, 
including FreedomFi, Open5Gs, OpenAirInterface, and SysLTE. While each project had 
its own merits, OpenAirInterface was chosen for its compliance with 3GPP standards and 
robust development practices. Additionally, the OpenAirInterface software provided the 
largest set of features. Each of the projects is briefly described. 
a. FreedomFi 
This project leverages an open-source distributed mobile packet project called 
Magma, created by the Connectivity sub-division of Facebook, to create a private 4G or 
5G network. FreedomFi offers a gateway loaded with the Magma software for $300 [32]. 
This gateway interfaces between the private network and larger mobile network core that 
holds the billing and subscriber information. A complete open stack network using 
FreedomFi would still require an open-source RAN and likely some additional CN 
features. Customer support requires an account with FreedomFi and was not evaluated. 
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b. Open5Gs 
This project implements a 4G and 5G CN in the C programming language that 
claims to be compliant with release 16 of 3GPP mobile telephony standards [33]. While 
the tutorials are incredibly detailed and span a variety of configuration options, closer 
analysis of the project source code on GitHub reveals that an overwhelming percentage of 
commits are by a single person. Furthermore, the project does not provide any software for 
the RAN. 
c. OpenAirInterface 
The OpenAirInterface (OAI) Software Alliance (OSA) focuses on three projects: a 
RAN, a CN, and a continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) system. 
These projects started as 4G LTE software and are progressing towards 5G NR solutions. 
For example, the EPC software utilizes containers to host each of the network functions as 
a steppingstone to a 5G CN. The OSA CI/CD project highlights the dedication of the team 
to delivering robust software. Compliance with 3GPP standards is provided for each 
project, along with timelines for future updates. OSA members include major industry 
players such as Qualcomm, Xilinx, Nokia, Inmarsat, Fujitsu, and Facebook Connectivity, 
as well as numerous universities and research institutions [34]. An active community 
surrounds the OAI team, but the separation of software projects and rapid development 
hampers documentation. While plenty of third-party resources exist, the information tends 
to be significantly outdated when compared to the latest stable branch on GitHub. 
d. srsLTE 
This project, recently renamed srsRAN to reflect a transition past 4G solutions, 
provides software for both the RAN and CN. Additionally, an application is provided to 
test UE functionality with an SDR instead of a COTS UE. The project is supported by 
organizations such as Analog Devices, National Instruments, Nokia, and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, among others [35]. Getting started guides are available and easy 
to navigate, but do not reflect the same degree of adaptability to various usage cases 
exhibited by the OAI software. The CN software is not emphasized as much as the RAN 
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or UE software, suggesting a minimal level of functionality. Lastly, the CN software does 
not include any information on compliance with 3GPP standards. 
3. OAI Software Projects and Utilities 
The software provided by the OSA is divided into two projects: OpenAir5G and 
OpenAirEPC-FED. The first project, OpenAir5G, includes tools and utilities to test the 
RAN and network interfaces for both 4G and 5G. The second project, OpenAirEPC-FED, 
contains software used to build the 4G Evolved Packet Core (EPC). 
a. OpenAir5G 
This project focuses on utilities for simulating, testing, and implementing the RAN 
of 4G and 5G networks via SDR. Some of the major utilities packaged with this project 
include: 
• Softmodem: an application used to simulate or run a 4G eNB or 5G gNB 
using an SDR as the radio front-end and parameters specified in a 
configuration file 
• UE-softmodem: an application used to simulate a UE via SDR and a 
virtual SIM card with command line tuning parameters 
• Virtual SIM programmer: a script used to generate a select subset of the 
parameters typically stored in the USIM application. This script must be 
used to generate valid credentials prior to attaching the UE-softmodem to 
an open stack network complete with EPC 
• Virtual Oscilloscopes: a run-time utility that executes code programmed 
into the SDR FPGA to display real-time graphics for the wireless 
interface. The display includes time and frequency plots of the received 
signal, channel throughput, and a received constellation diagram as shown 
in and Figure 17 and Figure 18. 
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 OAI UE Oscilloscope. Source: [34].
36 
 
 OAI eNB Oscilloscope. Source: [34]. 
• Simulators: numerous simulators are included so that almost every aspect 
of the network can be simulated. The core network, wireless link, and RF 
channel can all be defined virtually. 
• T tracer utility: a utility that allows for debugging of selected packetized 
information at various levels of the wireless stack. This utility can also be 
used to monitor both physical layer parameters (like those provided in the 
oscilloscope) and traces at each of the higher levels in the wireless stack as 
shown in Figure 19.
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 OAI eNB T Tracer Utility. Source: [34].
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b. OpenAirEPC-FED 
A separate project was created by the OSA to facilitate development of a 4G and 
5G CN. Design choices for the 4G EPC were made to ease the transition to a 5G CN. For 
example, 4G EPC network functions are instantiated as separate docker containers 
connected via virtual interfaces. 
4. Kernel Configurations 
While the OAI RAN and CN are designed to run on modern computers without 
needing accelerators or high-end graphics cards for data processing, they do require some 
configuration of the computer kernel for optimal performance. Especially for the computer 
running the RAN, this configuration is necessary to prevent data overflows and dropped 
frames. 
a. RAN Kernel Configuration 
The RAN Kernel was configured using the recommendations on the OAI wiki for 
Ubuntu 16.04 as a guide, since the computers used for this work were configured with 
Ubuntu 18.04. The major steps required were to install the low-latency kernel, remove all 
power management features such as P-states and C-states, disable CPU frequency scaling, 
and disable hyperthreading. The commands to accomplish each step and verify the step 
was completed are now presented. While ultimately unnecessary, the BIOS for the RAN 
computer was also updated to the latest version using a removable thumb-drive configured 
for the HP laptops. 
1. Install low-latency kernel 
The low-latency kernel is installed using (2) and can be verified with (3). If installed 
correctly, then the system should display “low-latency” instead of “generic” attached to the 
kernel version number. If the system fails to boot into the low-latency kernel, then hold 
“shift” after the computer reboots and before the operating system (OS) loads the log-in 
page to enter the grub menu. In this menu, the low-latency kernel can be selected as the 
preferred kernel. 
 sudo apt-get install linux-image-lowlatency linux-headers-lowlatency  (2) 
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 uname -a  (3) 
2. Remove all power management features 
To disable p-states and c-states, the following command is added to the file /etc/
default/grub before updating that boot options with “update-grub.”  
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=“quiet intel_pstate=disable 
processor.max_cstate=1 intel_idle.max_cstate=0 idle=poll” 
Then, to check that p-states and c-states are disabled, install the i7z utility with “sudo apt-
get install i7z” and verify that only c-state c0 is utilized when “sudo i7z” is run. 
Next, the Intel powerclamp module is disabled by adding “blacklist 
intel_powerclamp” to the end of the file /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist.conf. If the file does not 
exist, then an empty file with the same name should be made before adding the blacklist 
command. 
3. Disable frequency scaling 
The following commands are used to disable frequency scaling. First, install 
cpufrequtils with “sudo apt-get install cpufrequtils.” Then run “sudo systemctl disable 
ondemand” to prevent the CPU governor from switching modes. Next, set the governor 
with “sudo cpufreq-set -g performance” and restart the process with “sudo /etc/init.d/
cpufrequtils restart.” If done successfully, then when “cpufreq-info” is run, all cores should 
show the governor as set to “performance.” Another check is to verify with “sudo i7z” that 
all cores are operating at the maximum frequency. 
4. Disable hyperthreading 
On the HP laptops, hyperthreading is disabled in the BIOS menu. During computer 
booting, press “F10” to enter the BIOS menu. Log in to the BIOS as an admin. This may 
require entering or making a password. For the RAN laptop, the BIOS password was set 
as “1qaz2wsx!QAZ@WSX.” Next, deep sleep was disabled so that the Intel HT 
(hyperthreading) technology could be toggled off. 
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b. CN Kernel Configuration 
The CN Kernel configuration guide recommends installing the GTP kernel 
modules. However, this step is likely a relic of the EPC project before it shifted to using 





sudo dpkg -i linux-headers-4.8.0-040800-generic_4.8.0-
040800.201610022031_amd64.deb 
sudo dpkg -i linux-image-4.8.0-040800-generic_4.8.0-
040800.201610022031_amd64.deb 
After rebooting, the kernel module and version can be checked with “uname -a,” 
“sudo modprobe gtp,” and “dmesg | tail.” 
5. Software Configuration 
Each OAI project has a different method to configure and run the software. The 
RAN project is downloaded as a cloned repository from GitHub in which build scripts 
compile shared libraries to create executable files. The CN project is also downloaded as a 
cloned repository from GitHub, but it contains scripts for configuring containers built using 
the Docker platform. The steps to build each project are described in this section. Although 
the latest master branch was originally used for the open stack network, ultimately a recent 
developer branch was required in most cases. 
a. RAN Software Build 
Despite requiring a more complex kernel configuration, the RAN software build is 
simple and straightforward. A repository containing the 4G and 5G RAN is available on 
GitLab. If not already installed on the computer, git can be installed from the Ubuntu 
repositories via package manager with “sudo apt-get install subversion git cmake.” Once 
git is installed, the repository is cloned with “git clone https://gitlab.eurecom.fr/oai/
openairinterface5g.git.” For this work, the 2020.w47 tag from the developer branch was 
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utilized. The user then navigates to the newly created directory with “cd 
openairinterface5g” and initializes some environment variables used by the software with 
“source oaienv.” Next, the user navigates to the cmake directory with “cd cmake_targets.” 
Finally, the user builds the desired RAN software with “./build_oai -I -w USRP --eNB --
UE --buildlib enbscope --build-lib uescope.” A summary of the flags used in the build 
script is provided in Table 8. 
Table 8. OAI RAN Build Script Flag Summary 
Flag Purpose 
-I Install external dependencies using the package manager 
-w Select desired radio front-end (USRP, bladeRF, hackRF, etc) 
--eNB Build the eNB executable 
--UE Build the UE executable and associated utilities 
--build-lib Used to build additional supported libraries such as the oscilloscopes for the 
eNB and UE 
-c Erase previously built files for target (UE or eNB) before starting new build 
-C Erase previously built files for all targets before starting new build 
-g Build binaries with support for gdb 
-h Display help information for script and list complete flag summary 
 
Analysis of the build_oai script reveals that all instances of the USRP hardware 
driver (UHD) are first removed and then the latest version from the Ettus Research 
repositories is installed in the function “check_install_usrp_uhd_driver.” This can cause 
software mismatch errors that prevent the OAI RAN software from executing properly if a 
different version of UHD is installed from source. 
The RAN software is executed from the “~/openairinterface5g/cmake_targets/
ran_build/build” directory after first executing “source oaienv” from the 
“~/openairinterface5g” directory. A log file containing the information the eNB or UE 
script prints to the terminal window can be created by appending “| tee eNB.log” or “| tee 
UE.log” to the command used to execute the software. 
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b. CN Software Build 
In contrast to the CN kernel configuration, the steps required to build the software 
are more complex. The OAI 4G LTE EPC uses the Docker platform to create individual 
containers for each of the EPC network functions. Docker containers are similar to virtual 
machines running on a host device, except they typically have less of the overhead and 
additional services provided by an OS. In the Docker environment, images are used to build 
containers, just like how OS image files (.iso) are required to build virtual machines. 
The OAI EPC implementation differs slightly from the textbook EPC architecture 
by combining the S-GW and P-GW into a single entity labelled the SP-GW that is then 
separated into a control plane and user plane container. Figure 20 depicts a network 
diagram for the OAI EPC with labels for the interfaces between network functions. The 
middle box containing the control-plane aspects of the S-GW and P-GW is instantiated as 
a singled container called the SPGW-C in the software. The bottom box containing the 
user-plane aspects of the S-GW and P-GW is called the SPGW-U in the software. 
 
 EPC Architecture in OAI 4G CN Software 
After installing the Docker software, base images are pulled from the Docker 
repository for Ubuntu 18.04 and the Cassandra database management system. The Ubuntu 
images are used as the basis for creating the EPC network function images and the 
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Cassandra image is used to create a database that stores subscriber information. The 
Cassandra container operates exclusively with the HSS container. Additionally, the CN 
computer is configured to enable IP forwarding and the Docker network bridge is assigned 
an IP address on the desired network. The Docker network bridge is used to allow 
containers on one host machine to interact with other devices on the network. 
The remaining steps required to configure the CN are covered in this section and 
explicitly detailed in Appendix E. First, additional docker images are built for each EPC 
network function using software downloaded from the OAI GitHub repository at 
https://github.com/OPENAIRINTERFACE/openair-epc-fed.git. Table 9 provides the 
software versions used for each of the OAI EPC network-function images. The SPGW-U 
image is referred to as SPGW-U-tiny to reflect the fact that a limited number of users can 
be supported. No other size SPGW-U image is offered on the public-facing OAI websites. 
Table 9. OAI EPC Network Function Software Branch and Tags 
Network Function Branch Tag 
HSS Master V1.1.1 
MME Developer 2020.w47 
SPGW-C Master V1.1.0 
SPGW-U-tiny Master V1.1.0 
 
Next, Python scripts are executed to generate configuration files for each of the 
containers. The configuration files are used with the images to create each of the four 
network function containers and the Cassandra database container. The containers are then 
connected to a private network so that the network functions can communicate with one 
another. During the configuration process, the MME, SPGW-C, and SPGW-U-tiny 
functions are made reachable through the Docker network bridge for devices external to 
the CN host machine. Also, the configuration process creates subscriber information for a 
specified number of users. Finally, the network functions can be started and stopped as 
desired to test the EPC. When the containers are started or secured, a specific order must 
be followed: HSS, MME, SPGW-C, and SPGW-U-tiny. 
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Scripts were created to facilitate each of the steps required to configure the EPC so 
that changes to network parameters could be made without manually reworking the 
software installation and configuration process. These scripts were divided between each 
of the steps described (i.e., image creation, container configuration, container launching, 
and container stopping) and an additional script to facilitate restarting each container after 
the host machine was rebooted. These scripts form each of the sections in Appendix E and 
are provided with the electronic source material for this work. 
A final note about the OAI EPC software is that there are multiple ways to deploy 
the Docker containers. Instead of manually launching and stopping the containers after 
configuration as described, a separate process can be followed to configure and 
permanently launch the containers. This process is more appropriate for a permanently 
deployed EPC instead of one used for research. When the permanent deployment was used, 
the resulting EPC log files overflowed the available memory on the host machine after 72 
hours of continuous operation. A method of maintaining and storing large volumes of EPC 
logs generated by the software is not provided. Additionally, a recent developer branch has 
shifted towards integration of the OAI EPC software with Magma MME software from 
Facebook Connectivity. This branch utilizes the “docker-compose” set of commands to 
replace the scripts from the described approach. 
 OPEN STACK NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
After configuring the open stack network software, additional steps are still 
required to connect a COTS UE to the network. These include programming the USIM 
application with correctly provisioned data, testing the network interfaces, and obtaining 
access to the EC20 modem commands. 
1. Subscriber Information Provisioning 
For simplicity, the information for a subscriber was copied from the HSS 
configuration file to provision the USIM instead of generating a completely new 
subscriber. Three applications were evaluated to read and write to the UICC: pySIM, SIM 
manager from Dekart, and GRSIMwrite.exe from OYEI TIMES in Sehnzhen, China. 
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pySIM is an open-source project for reading and writing subscriber information. 
This project uses the Python programming language and was excellent for reading data 
from the UICC. Programming subscriber information onto the UICC, however, was limited 
to basic parameters such as the IMSI, MSISDN, ICCID, and cryptographic keys. While 
additional functionality could be programmed into pySIM, this is left as an item for future 
work. 
Dekart SIM manager was trial software best suited for reading the UICC. It 
displayed the results of the read command in a detailed tree structure with each the 
hexadecimal offset for each file. The software was unable to program the blank UICCs 
available, which might be a limitation of the trial period. 
OYEI TIME GRSIMwrite.exe was the most capable application evaluated for 
writing information to the UICC. The software displays the answer to reset (ATR) code 
used to identify the UICC and its capabilities. Within the application, separate tabs exist 
for most cellular technologies. In addition to the basic subscriber information, various types 
of PLMN (e.g., home, operator, forbidden), the number of the SMS provider, and the 
service provider name can be programmed. The only drawback to the software is that it 
does not come with any support or user guide for the other available features. 
2. Network Diagram and Software Commands 
Multiple partial network set-ups were utilized to test each aspect of the open stack 
network before attempting a full network set-up. These set-ups are described here to 
provide a variety of methods to troubleshoot the open stack network. Section V.A discusses 
how each set-up was used to achieve UE operation over the complete open stack network. 
The soft UE refers to the use of the OAI UE application running on an additional computer. 
1. eNB and Soft UE over Ethernet. This operation mode ensures that the 
OAI RAN software has been properly installed by transmitting LTE 
packets over an Ethernet interface without using any RF devices. No EPC 
is required for this set-up. 
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2. eNB and Soft UE over RF. This operation mode tests the wireless 
interface between the eNB and UE without the EPC. To avoid the need for 
a Faraday cage, this set-up was used with SMA cables. The transmitter of 
one SDR was connected to the receiver of the other SDR with 30 dB of in-
line attenuation to prevent inadvertent damage to the radio interfaces. 
3. eNB, EPC, and Soft UE over Ethernet. This operation mode tests the 
network interfaces between the eNB and EPC as well as checking that the 
soft UE and EPC have matching subscriber information. All 
communications are passed over Ethernet. 
4. eNB, EPC, and Soft UE with Wireless Link. This mode tests the 
network interfaces between all devices and includes the wireless link 
between the UE and eNB. In this set-up, the entire open stack network is 
tested using the soft UE instead of a commercial UE. 
5. eNB, EPC, and COTS UE. This mode tests the entire open stack network 
with a fully functional UE. For UEs without displays, a computer must be 
used to pass commands to the modem and attach it to the network. This 
process is discussed in the following section. 
3. EC20 Modem Commands 
The EC20 modem can be controlled by an externally connected computer through 
two methods. The first method involves using the QNavigator software provided by 
Quectel. The second is to use the DiagParser and minicom utilities to remotely run 
commands on the modem. While QNavigator includes a library of modem commands and 
their usage, the second method can also be used to obtain root access to the modem OS. 
Each method was used to explore the EC20 modem. The process required to execute each 
of these methods are presented in the remainder of this section. Modem commands are also 
called AT commands, where “AT” is meant to grab the attention of the modem. 
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a. QNavigator 
Version 1.6.9.1 of the QNavigator software is the most recent update to the modem 
interfacing utility from Quectel. This version includes support for 4G LTE devices, which 
was necessary for testing the modem in the 4G LTE open stack implementation. As a 
graphical, Windows-based program, minimal configuration was required. The program and 
Quectel modem drivers were installed using default parameters. Then, the EC20 was 
connected to the computer via USB interface on the developer board. After opening the 
software, selecting LTE and following the on-screen prompts, the program automatically 
attempts to register the modem to an available network. 
The left-hand side of Figure 21 contains tabs used for common tasks such as 
sending text messages, initiating voice calls, and managing TCP/UDP connections. The 
center pane displays information for the currently selected task. In this case, the home tab 
displays information about the modem, network registration, and subscriber. Other tabs 
contain macros for their designated tasks to minimize the need for memorizing AT 
commands. The right-hand pane displays a log of the previously executed AT commands. 
Single commands can be sent using the text input box below the log.
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 QNavigator Screenshot 
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b. DiagParser and Minicom Utilities 
The EC20 can also be controlled through Linux command line utilities diag_parser 
and minicom. DiagParser decodes the byte-level messages output by the modem in the 
Qualcomm DIAG format. Three terminal windows are required: one to read the DIAG 
code, one to decode the DIAG message format, and one to send commands to the modem. 
Appendix F contains detailed steps for this method, including additional steps to capture 
mobile telephony packets in Wireshark and access the modem Linux OS. The process for 
executing modem-level commands is provided in the remainder of this section. 
1. Open a terminal window and launch the minicom utility with “sudo 
minicom -s.” Within the utility, select “setup” and change the path to 
“/dev/ttyUSB0.” Escape and exit the menu. The raw byte-level messages 
from the modem will now display on the screen. 
2. In a second terminal window, change directory to the DiagParser utility 
with “cd ~/diag_parser.” Run the utility with “sudo ./diag_parser -g 
127.0.0.1 -i /dev/ttyUSB0 -v” to decode the packets received by the 
modem. 
3. In the third terminal window, run “sudo minicom -s.” Select “setup” and 
change the device path to “/dev/ttyUSB2.” Escape and exit the menu. The 
modem will attempt to execute its initialization AT commands. To make 
the user input visible, type “ATE1” and hit the return key. 
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IV. SPOOFED NETWORK ATTACK THEORY 
After successful implementation of the open stack 4G LTE network, a few findings 
stood out from an attack perspective. First, the user programs all the parameters used for 
network identification without any external forcing function to prevent copying parameters 
specific to the MNO. Second, the UE and network mutually authenticate via a shared set 
of parameters, most of which are available in the USIM application. There is no verification 
of either entity through a trusted third party. Finally, most subscriber parameters can be 
read using modem-level commands without requiring privilege escalation. Combined, 
these weaknesses form the basis for elevating the legacy false base station attack into a 
spoofed network attack. 
 REQUIRED NETWORK PARAMETERS 
When configuring the network core containers, the user programs network 
parameters such as the MCC, MNC, TAC, APN, and the Operator Variant Algorithm 
Configuration Field (OP). Except for OP, these network parameters are either broadcast by 
cell towers or easily found on UEs attached to the commercial network. Figure 22 is a 
screenshot from the LTE Discovery application depicting the MCC, MNC, and TAC for a 
cellular tower near the NPS campus. The APN and OP are configured in the HSS container, 
while the MCC, MNC, and TAC are configured in the MME container. In the OAI EPC 
software, the APN is required to configure the hybrid SPGW-C container that combines 
the control plane functionality of the SGW and the PGW. 
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 LTE Discovery Screenshot of an LTE Cell Parameters 
OP is a 128-bit key, specific to the MNO or MVNO, used to provide an additional 
layer of protection to the subscriber’s secret key, Ki. The OPC is derived from OP using 
(4) where the encryption algorithm, E, could be any 128-bit keyed function that uses a 128-
bit key [36]. 3GPP analysis and commercial practice use the Rijndael algorithm specified 
in the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with the encryption key, K, being the 
subscriber secret key, Ki. 3GPP recommendations in §8.3 of [36] are to store OP and 
calculate OPC off the USIM to prevent discovery and inhibit reverse engineering of the 
OP. 
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 ( )C KOP OP E OP= ⊕  (4) 
Although many of the network parameters are known, the protection against 
spoofed networks is threefold: subscriber information must be known for each target; 
certain MNO-specific secret parameters must also be known; and large-scale network 
deployment is unlikely to remain covert. The spoofed network attack is best suited for a 
small number of target devices with modem-level vulnerabilities that operate within a 
suitable cell size. 
 THEORETICAL STEPS 
The following keys steps form a theoretical exploitation chain that utilizes the 
component-level vulnerabilities in Qualcomm GNSS chipsets to force a target device to 
attach to a spoofed network. 
1. The attacker uses vulnerabilities in the GNSS chipset to gain access to the 
cellular modem. 
2. The attacker then uses AT commands to formulate legitimate queries for 
subscriber information on the phone such as IMSI, keys, or cryptography 
capabilities and stores the results in a temporary file on the embedded 
Linux operating system of the modem. 
3. At a desired time, the target UE transmits the collected information to 
another UE owned by the attacker via SMS messages created with AT 
commands. These messages are transparent to the user-application level. 
4. Subscriber information is post-processed to recover Ki from CK and IK. 
5. The attacker adds the valid user credentials of the target to the subscriber 
information database: the HSS or UDM. 
6. When desired, the attacker utilizes the exploit from step 1 to regain access 
to the UE and manually attach the device to the spoofed network. 
Alternatively, the list of preferred PLMNs can be updated during initial 
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access so that the target UE automatically reconnects to the spoofed 
network whenever it is available. 
7. The target network traffic is now visible to the attacker. As the owner and 
maintainer of the spoofed network, the attacker can filter or alter any 
traffic to or from the UE. 
This exploitation chain, while theoretical, includes several steps that were 
reproduced using commercial hardware and the open stack network. These steps will be 
further discussed in the Results chapter of this thesis. 
 GNSS COMPONENT VULNERABILITIES 
In [1], multiple vulnerabilities are listed which, when combined, could allow for 
execution of arbitrary code in Google Android operating systems (OS). Some of the 
vulnerabilities are specific to the OS, but the majority are related to Qualcomm 
components. An additional vulnerability is posted in CVE-2018-13911 in which the GNSS 
XTRA parser can be forced into reading and accessing out of bounds memory locations 
[4]. 
The prevalence of cellular modems that come bundled with GNSS functionality by 
semiconductor manufacturers makes GNSS vulnerabilities a tempting starting point for 
attackers. Furthermore, the numerous CVEs regarding Qualcomm components cover a 
variety of product lines. Since the cellular modem typically controls the GNSS functions, 
exploits that target the GNSS logic would not require additional permissions to execute 
commands on the modem. The complex manipulation of GNSS vulnerabilities required to 
execute arbitrary AT commands is not further explored in this thesis (but is an item of 
future work), but a comparison can be made to the SIMJacker attack [37]. 
Like the SIMJacker, the proposed GNSS exploitation chain seeks to extract 
subscriber information from the USIM application through manipulation of modem 
functionality. Both SIMJacker and the proposed GNSS exploitation chain require 
significant computational resources to uncover the key Ki. While the SIMJacker attack can 
be used to brute force 3DES encryption using rainbow tables, the proposed exploitation 
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only requires backtracking a single step from the Cipher Key (CK) and Integrity Key (IK) 
to recover Ki. New algorithms for recovering Ki could be devised to reduce the 
computational time by taking advantage of additional module information exfiltrated 
during initial access. Another difference is that SIMJacker utilizes specially crafted Over 
The Air (OTA) binary messages to target vulnerable S@T Browser technology on the 
target USIM, and the proposed exploitation chain would use vulnerabilities in the GNSS 
chipset to execute legitimate modem-level AT commands. 
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V. RESULTS 
 OPEN STACK NETWORK RESULTS 
This chapter discusses each of the steps used to test the open stack network 
implementation with applicable lessons learned. The following subsections are organized 
to reflect each network configuration utilized in the testing process. While the process 
presented follows the logical network progression presented in Section III.C.2, the actual 
experimentation progression was not as straightforward due to the disjointed and 
incomplete documentation available on the OAI wiki pages. A key contribution of this 
thesis is a consolidation of logical and repeatable steps to implement an OAI 4G LTE open 
stack network. Appendix G contains a guide to each of the archived network tests and 
contains the logs, configuration files, and packet captures of a desired test in the 
supplemental materials. 
1. Network Configuration 1: eNB and Soft UE over Ethernet 
After installing and configuring the OAI RAN software on two computers, the 
machines were connected via Ethernet cable to test the software without the RF interface. 
The machine running the eNB application was configured with an IP address of 
192.168.13.1 and the machine running the UE application was configured with an IP 
address of 192.168.22.1. The IP address of the EPC computer, 192.168.14.1, was used as 
the gateway address on all computers because it was configured to forward local traffic 
through the NPS enterprise network. Figure 23 depicts the network addressing scheme used 
throughout the open stack network implementation. 
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 4G LTE Open Stack Network IP Address Assignment 
On the eNB machine, a terminal window was navigated to the “~/openairinterface5g/
cmake_targets/ran_build/build” directory. Then, the eNB application was executed using a 
default configuration file provided with the RAN software as shown: 
ENODEB=1 sudo -E ./lte-softmodem -O ~/openairinterface5g/ci-scripts/
conf_files/lte-fdd-basic-sim.conf --basicsim --noS1 --nokrnmod 1 | tee 
eNB.log” 
The first argument, “ENODEB=1” is required in the basic simulator mode to tell the 
software to run in server mode and listen to all IP address on port 4043. The “-E” flag is used 
to preserve the OAI environmental variables while executing the eNB software. The “-O” flag 
is used to indicate the configuration file to be used with the eNB software. The “--basicsim” 
flag is used to indicate that all traffic will be passed over Ethernet without the RF interface. 
The “--nokrnmod 1” flag can be used when the “--noS1” flag is set to force the usage of the 
tunnel interface instead of using the nasmesh kernel module. Current tags of the RAN software 
utilize the tunnel interface by default, which makes the flag unnecessary. Finally, the “| tee 
eNB.log” is used to create a log file of the information the eNB software prints to the screen. 
59 
On the UE machine, a terminal window was navigated to the “~/openairinterface5g/
cmake_targets/ran_build/build” directory. Then, the soft UE application was executed and 
configured to match the eNB parameters. 
TCPBRIDGE=192.168.13.1 sudo -E ./lte-uesoftmodem -C 2680000000 -r 25 
--ue-rxgain 140 --basicsim --noS1 | tee UE.log” 
where the “TCPBRIDGE=192.168.13.1” specifies the IP address of the eNB machine. The “-
C” flag is used to specify the carrier frequency of the eNB downlink signal in Hz and the “-r” 
flag specifies the number of radio bearers on the downlink. The “--ux-rxgain” flag is used to 
specify the gain used by the UE receiver. All flags are used for the same purpose as in the eNB 
software. 
The UE machine connected to the eNB machine and created two additional network 
interfaces on each machine as shown in Table 10. Successful connectivity was verified by 
using the ping utility. The UE machine was pinged from the eNB machine with “ping -I 
oaitun_enb1 -c 20 10.0.1.2.” Similarly, the eNB machine was pinged from the UE machine 
with “ping -I oaitun_ue1 -c 20 10.0.1.1.” In each case, 100% of packets were received with 
round-trip-times (RTT) shown in Table 11.  
Table 10. OAI Interfaces Created by Basic Simulator 
Machine Interface Name IP Address 
eNB oaitun_enb1 10.0.1.1 
eNB oaitun_enm1 10.0.2.1 
UE oaitun_ue1 10.0.1.2 
UE oaitun_uem1 10.0.2.2 
 
Table 11. RTT Comparison Between Ethernet and Network 
Configuration 1 
 RTT 
Connection Type Minimum Average Maximum 
Network Configuration 1 6.994 ms 9.179 ms 13.692 ms 
Direct Ethernet 0.154 ms 0.162 ms 0.177 ms 
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2. Network Configuration 2: eNB and Soft UE with RF Interface 
Prior to testing in network configuration two, the operation of each USRP B200 
was verified through a simple FM radio receiver application in GnuRadio. On one of the 
computers, the USRP was not recognized. The solution was to create a file at “/etc/udev/
rules.d/10-usrp.rules,” as discussed in Appendix H, and then reboot the computer. To test 
each USRP transmitter, a cosine wave was generated at 2.68 GHz and 0 dB gain in 
GnuRadio and coupled via SMA cable into an Agilent MXA Signal Analyzer. The signal 
was received at -75 dBm which showed that the USRP transmitters were functional and 
provided a coarse device power calibration. 
The Ethernet cable was removed from the two computers. A USRP B200 was 
connected to each computer via USB3 port. The transmitter of each USRP was connected 
to the receiver of the other USRP with an additional 30 dB in-line attenuator to protect the 
SDR internals from high-powered signals. This setup is shown in Figure 24 with the UE 
computer on the left and the eNB computer on the right. 
 
 Implemented 4G LTE Open Stack Network in 
Configuration 2 
On the eNB machine, a terminal window was navigated to the 
“~/openairinterface5g/cmake_targets/ran_build/build” directory. Then, the eNB 
application was executed using a configuration file provided with the RAN software for 
operation in LTE band 7 as shown: 
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sudo -E ./lte_build_oai/build/lte-softmodem -O ~/openairinterface5g/ci-
scripts/conf_files/my-enb.band7.tm1.25PRB.usrpb210.conf --nokrnmod 1 
--noS1 --eNBs.[0].rrc_inactivity_threshold 30 | tee ENB.log  
All arguments retain their functionality as described in network configuration 1. The 
configuration file used was provided with the RAN software and calibrated for operation 
of the B200 series USRP in LTE band 7 with 30 dB attenuators. For this test, no 
modifications to the configuration file were required. The “--eNBs” flag is used to alter 
parameters defined in the configuration file. In this command, the radio resource control 
(RRC) inactivity threshold was set to 30 seconds. 
On the UE machine, a terminal window was navigated to the “~/openairinterface5g/
cmake_targets/ran_build/build” directory. Then, the UE application was executed with the 
following command: 
sudo ./lte-uesoftmodem -C 2680000000 -r 25 --ue-rxgain 120 --ue-txgain 
0 --ue-max-power 0 --ue-scan-carrier --nokrnmod 1 --noS1 | tee UE.log  
All arguments retain their functionality as previously described. Additional flags were 
utilized to set initial values for the transmitter gain, the maximum allowable transmitter 
power in dBm, and to ensure that the UE scanned for carrier frequencies offset from the 
nominal value specified. 
Initially, the master branch of the RAN software was utilized for this test. Although 
the UE and eNB would attach, numerous problems arose including segmentation faults, 
buffer underflows, and buffer overflows. Troubleshooting efforts focused on altering 
several parameters in the eNB configuration file, including transmitter and receiver gain 
and different combinations of threading, but nothing solved the problems. Confident that 
the problems were not the result of errors in the eNB configuration, the RAN software was 
rebuilt using the developer branch tag 2020.w47 as described in Section III.B.5. This 
network configuration was then retested. With the developer branch of the software, none 
of the issues found with the master branch were observed over multiple hour-long tests. 
The network connection was tested by pinging each interface as was done with 
network configuration 1. RTTs for a direct Ethernet connection, network configuration 1 
and 2 are presented in Table 12. Network configuration 2 exhibited the longest RTT of all 
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three connections, including a factor of three increase over the RTT of network 
configuration 1. The most likely cause of this additional latency is the processing time 
required for the SDR to reconstruct the packets from received raw samples. 
Table 12. Network Configuration 2 iPerf Testing Results 
 RTT 
Connection Type Minimum Average Maximum 
Direct Ethernet 0.154 ms 0.162 ms 0.177 ms 
Network Configuration 1 6.994 ms 9.179 ms 13.692 ms 
Network Configuration 2 20.411 ms 30.785 ms 37.063 ms 
 
3. Network Configuration 3: EPC, eNB, and Soft UE over Ethernet 
Similar to network configuration one, this step connected all three components 
together via Ethernet cables and network switch. The machine running the eNB application 
was configured with an IP address of 192.168.13.1. The machine running the UE 
application was configured with an IP address of 192.168.22.1. The machine running the 
EPC application was configured with an IP address of 192.168.14.1. All computers used 
192.168.14.1 as the gateway address. The network assignments for the eNB and EPC are 
depicted in Figure 23. 
The EPC computer was also connected to the NPS campus WiFi, with the 
connection shareable to the other computers on the private subnetwork. Since the EPC 
software runs on a private subnetwork behind the Docker network bridge, a route was 
added on the eNB computer with the following command: 
sudo ip route add 192.168.61.0/26 via 192.168.17.1 dev eth0 
Prior to starting the test, connectivity between the eNB and EPC network functions was 
verified by pinging the MME, SPGW-C, and SPGW-U-tiny from the eNB. The Cassandra 
database and HSS containers were configured so that they are not accessible to networked 
devices outside the 192.168.61.0/26 subnetwork. 
63 
First, the EPC network functions were launched using the 
“Launch_4G_Containers.sh” script. After a few seconds, the MME log displays a line 
indicating that a listening socket has been created on port 36412 with the IP address 
associated with the MME container. Once this message has been displayed, the eNB 
application was run with: 
ENODEB=1 sudo -E ./lte-softmodem -O ~/openairinterface5g/ci-scripts/
conf_files/net3_lte-fdd-basic-sim.conf --basicsim --nokrnmod 1 | tee 
eNB.log” 
where the configuration file was an edited copy of the “lte-fdd-basic-sim.conf” file. In the 
configuration file, CI_MME_IP_ADDR was replaced with 192.168.61.3 and all instances 
of CI_ENB_IP_ADDR were replaced with 192.168.13.1. Successful connection of the 
eNB to the EPC was shown in the periodic MME updates printed to the terminal window. 
The number of connected eNBs increased from zero to one after displaying multiple lines 
of peering information as shown in Figure 25. Additionally, the eNB log displayed several 
lines of peering information that was similar what was contained in the MME log. 
 
 Screenshot of eNB Pairing with EPC in MME Log 
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Before running the UE software, a soft SIM was programmed using additional tools 
from the OAI RAN software. A copy of the file “ue_eurecom_test_sfr.conf” at 
“~/openairinterface5g/openair3/NAS/TOOLS/” was saved as “ue.conf” in the file path for 
the eNB and UE executables. In the “ue.conf” file, several parameters were updated to 
reflect the values used in the EPC configuration as shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. Network and Subscriber Parameters for Soft UE 
Parameter Value 
MCC/MNC 404/92 
Full Network Name AirTel 




After editing the configuration file, a soft SIM was created for the soft UE with: 
../../nas_sim_tools/build/conf2uedata -c ue.conf -o . 
Finally, the UE software was executed with: 
TCPBRIDGE=192.168.13.1 sudo -E ./lte-uesoftmodem -C 2680000000 -r 
25 --ue-rxgain 140 --basicsim | tee UE.log” 
When the UE completed connecting and attaching to the EPC, the statistics section 
of the MME log automatically updated itself to reflect that one UE was attached to the 
network. In a new terminal on the UE computer, the “ifconfig” utility was run and 
displayed two new interfaces. The first interface “oaitun_ue1” had an IP address of 12.1.12, 
which had been assigned by the EPC. The second interface “oaitun_uem1” had and IP 
address of 10.0.2.2 as seen for the previous two network configurations. 
To test the network in this configuration, an additional terminal window on the UE 
computer was used to ping 8.8.8.8 via the “oaitun_ue1” interface. The first attempt was 
unsuccessful because network address translation was not enabled in the SPGW-U 
container. The container was rebuilt with an additional flag in the Python configuration file 
for “--network_ue_nat_option=yes.” After restarting the EPC, the UE was able to ping 
8.8.8.8 and other external webservers.  
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4. Network Configuration 4: EPC, eNB, and Soft UE with RF Interface 
In this configuration, which is similar to that of network configuration three, the 
Ethernet connection to the UE computer was removed and replaced with the RF link as in 
configuration two. All network parameters and IP addresses remained the same from network 
configuration three. First, the EPC network functions were launched using the 
“Launch_4G_Containers.sh” script. Once the MME log indicated it was ready for peering, the 
eNB application was run with: 
sudo -E ./lte-softmodem -~/openairinterface5g/ci-scripts/conf_files/my-
enb.band7.tm1.25PRB.usrpb210.conf | tee eNB.log” 
where the configuration file utilized the base file for the USRP B200 series devices in LTE 
band 7 and replaced the default MME and eNB IP addresses with 192.168.61.3 and 
192.168.13.1, respectively. The RRC inactivity threshold was set at 30 seconds in the 
configuration file and was sufficient for this test. 
After the eNB completed peering with the EPC, the UE software was run with: 
sudo ./lte-uesoftmodem -C 2680000000 -r 25 --ue-rxgain 120 --ue-txgain 0 --
ue-max-power 0 --ue-scan-carrier | tee UE.log  
All arguments retain their functionality as previously described. Successful connection and 
attachment of the UE to the network was observed in the MME log. The UE then successfully 
pinged 8.8.8.8 and other external web servers. 
To better understand the flow of packets in the open stack network, a reverse ping 
command was made to the IP address of the eNB computer. The reverse ping showed the 
packet transfer from the UE to the SPGW-U-tiny container to the EPC host network interface 
and then to the eNB computer. This confirmed that traffic between the UE and EPC is passed 
through tunnel interfaces. Additionally, the reverse ping test reinforced the separation between 
the EPC container subnetwork and the EPC host networking utilities. 
5. Network Configuration 5: EPC, eNB, and COTS UE 
In this network configuration, the soft UE from network configuration 4 was replaced 
with the EC20 UE. The “MAIN” antenna port was connected to the receiver port of the USRP 
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B200 and the “DIV” antenna port was connected to the transmitter port of the B200. Each of 
these connections included 30 dB of inline attenuation. An omnidirectional antenna was 
connected to the “GNSS” port on the EC20. This setup is displayed in Figure 26 with the laptop 
used to issue commands to the EC20 modem on the left and the eNB laptop and SDR on the 
right. The third laptop running the EPC software is not visible. 
 
 Implemented 4G LTE Open Stack Network in Configuration 
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Before the EC20 modem could be connected to the network, the subscriber information 
had to be programmed onto a UICC. First, a blank UICC was programmed with the pySIM 
application. In addition to the subscriber information in Table 13 for the soft SIM, an ICCID 
of 8991920123456789000 was provisioned. The format of the ICCID is 89 for mobile 
telephony, followed by the country calling code (91 for India), the MNC (92 for AirTel), and 
an account identification number (0123456789000). Once the UICC was programmed, it was 
verified with the pySIM reader and again with the Dekart SIM reader. 
The EPC and eNB were launched as described for network configuration four, except 
with a different configuration file for the eNB. In this configuration file, the LTE band was 
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changed to 3, downlink frequency to 1.87 GHz, and uplink frequency to 1.775 GHz. These 
values were chosen to operate within the specifications for a set of RF multiplexers available 
in the lab. Ultimately, the multiplexers were not needed for this work, but showcased the 
simplicity of switching frequency bands at the eNB. 
The EC20 was then powered on and communication was established with the UE 
computer. First, the command: 
 AT+COPS=? 
was sent to query which mobile networks the EC20 could detect. While the UE was able to 
detect the open stack AirTel network, it would not connect to the network. Additionally, the 
UE was able to detect a commercial T-Mobile network at -110 dBm through poorly shielded 
segments of SMA cabling. Next, the command: 
AT+QCFG=“nwscanmode”,3,1 
was used to force the EC20 to only scan for LTE networks. Additionally, the command: 
AT+QCFG=“band”,0,4,0,1 
was used to restrict the EC20 to LTE band 3. After both commands were executed, the 
registration status of the modem was queried with: 
AT+QNWINFO 
No network information was displayed, which confirmed the lack of attached UEs in the MME 
log. 
Since the entire network operation had been verified with the soft UE and soft SIM, 
the programmed UICC was identified as the problem. Further investigation into the UICC with 
the Dekart SIM reader revealed that the USIM application was not loaded onto the card. The 
UICC did have the SIM application loaded onto the card, which is where the subscriber 
information was programmed. 
A new set of UICCs with the USIM application pre-loaded were then obtained. 
Additionally, the UICCs came bundled with access to the OYEI TIMES SIM writer software. 
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This software was used to program the subscriber information in the yellow boxes shown in 
Figure 27. An MSISDN was also programmed to facilitate testing voice calls over the network. 
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 Subscriber Information Programmed via OYEI TIMES Software 
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The new UICC was inserted into the EC20 and access to the modem obtained on 
the UE computer. The modem was then connected to the network with the command:  
AT+COPS=1,2,“40492”,7 
Additionally, the address of the access point name (APN) was configured with the 
command: 
AT+CGDCONT=1,“IP”,“apn1.carrier.com”,“12.1.1.0” 
The MME log displayed completion of the authentication and key agreement process and 
attachment of a UE. On the EC20, a green LED turned on to indicate attachment to a 
network. Verification of the network was performed by executing the command: 
 AT+QPING=1,“8.8.8.8”,4,8 
to ping the Google webserver. All eight pings were successful with RTT as shown in Figure 
28 with the minicom utility. The QNavigator software was unable to identify the return 
ping messages which could be an issue with the Windows drivers for the EC20 modem. 
 
 Successful Ping from EC20 to Internet Server 
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While the EC20 was connected to the open stack network, several AT commands 
were tested to determine what functionality was available through modem-level 
commands. First, the command: 
AT+CLAC 
was run to list all commands available to the modem as specified in §8.37 of [38]. The 
results, listed in Appendix I, included several commands not listed in the guides provided 
by Quectel or the QNavigator software. Next, the command: 
AT+COPN 
was run to list all the network operators stored in the UE as specified in §7.21 of [38]. The 
results of this command, listed in Appendix J, is not stored in the UICC. The location of 
this file within the EC20 OS was not determined. 
Additionally, AT commands were attempted to make phone calls and send text 
messages. These network services failed because the open stack network was not 
configured to interoperate with other commercial networks, however, these services remain 
to be tested with a second COTS UE attached to the open stack network. 
 SIM CARD VULNERABILITY TESTING 
A blacklisted UICC with subscriber credentials for a commercial mobile network 
(T-Mobile Straight Talk) was used as a comparison when programming UICCs. It was also 
used as a platform for testing methods to extract subscriber information, including 
information unavailable through modem-level commands. 
The SIM Jacker tool was used to find vulnerable target application references 
(TARs) that could be susceptible to attack. TARs are part of a text message used to indicate 
the protocol or application to which the message should be delivered. Once identified, the 
vulnerable TARs were fuzzed to determine whether the TAR could be exploited.  
A complete scan of all TARs was completed over five days of continuous testing. 
Of all the TARs analyzed, only five were identified as potentially vulnerable: 0x443231, 
0x4F4241, 0XB00010, 0XB00011, and 0xB00012. 
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Each of the vulnerable TARs were then fuzzed to determine any undocumented sets 
of parameters that could be used to pass through spoofed over-the-air update (OTA) 
messages. Although 35 potentially nonstandard combinations of SMS parameters were 
identified by the fuzzer, none could be used with the SIM Jacker attack. The resistance of 
the UICC to the SIM Jacker attack suggests that manufactures have improved some of the 
security mechanisms on the UICC. 
 SPOOFED NETWORK ATTACK VECTOR TESTING 
The spoofed network attack vector described in Chapter IV outlines seven steps to 
execute the attack. While a detailed description of the mechanism to obtain modem-level 
access through GNSS vulnerabilities is not provided in this thesis, at least one security 
research organization has discovered an exploitation chain through the UE OS [39]. The 
following subsections describe how to extract subscriber data from the UICC and the 
implications in terms of the mobile telephony key hierarchy. 
1. Subscriber Data Harvesting 
A commercial UICC and the programmed test UICC were probed with various 
cellular modem commands to verify that the desired subscriber information could be 
recovered. Specific commands such as AT+CIMI or AT+QCCID can be used to query 
single parameters such as the IMSI or ICCID, respectively. For 5G capable UEs, 
AT+CSUPI and AT+CNAI can be used to query the SUPI and network specific identifier, 
respectively [38]. However, not all subscriber information can be accessed in this manner. 
For subscriber information that does not have a dedicated command, the AT+CRSM 
command was used to perform a binary read of the data. Table 14 lists some required 
subscriber information, the type of record storage, the offset from the USIM master file 
location, and the length of the record (if known). These parameters, listed in [26], are all 
required to construct a valid AT+CRSM command. While the EPC was not programmed 
with the appropriate credentials to authenticate the commercial UICC, it did not impact the 
ability to recover subscriber information through modem-level AT commands. 
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Table 14. USIM Application File Identifiers 
Parameter Record Type Offset (hex / decimal) Record Length 
IMSI Transparent 6F07 / 28423 9B 
Keys Transparent 6F08 / 28424 33B 
USIM Service Table Transparent 6F38 / 28472 ≥1B 
MSISDN Linear Fixed 6F40 / 28480 Variable 
Location Information Transparent 6F7E / 28542 11B 
 
2. Master Key Recovery 
Although backtracking of the Ki from the CK and IK values is difficult, these values 
provide a good starting point, as shown in Figure 29. A set of simplifying assumptions 
could significantly reduce the computational cost of brute forcing the Ki. First, MNOs 
likely use the same OP key across all of their UICCs or at least across a batch of UICCs. 
When the OP value is known, (4) can be rewritten as (5) where the only unknowns are the 
encryption algorithm and K value. 
 ( )C KOP OP E OP= ⊕  (4) 





























 5G Key Hierarchy. Source: [40]. 
The second assumption is that the encryption algorithms used by the MNO are 
common algorithms such as AES. This is because the UICC and CN must both utilize the 
same algorithm for AKA. Since the UICC should remain low-cost, it is unlikely to have 
specialized circuits for home-grown encryption algorithms. 
With these two assumptions, the number of unknown variables is minimized. Since 
CK, IK, and OP are known, a cluster of computers should be able to brute force the Ki 
value. The amount of time required to obtain a solution could be reduced by configuring 
the spoofed network with a low RRC inactivity threshold to generate more sets of security 
vectors.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provides a detailed guide to implementing an open stack 4G LTE 
network using the OAI software, an SDR, and a COTS UE. It also will assist others who 
would like to replicate the experimentation conducted as part of this thesis, or to use the 
open stack network to investigate other vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Instead of simply 
providing the commands to recreate a network with a specific set of parameters, this thesis 
also includes various network set-ups and utilities that can be used for troubleshooting, 
data collecting, or configuring a new network with different parameters. An archive of 
packet captures, configuration files, and logs is provided in the appendices and 
supplemental materials. 
The open stack network is presented as a low-cost, small-footprint 4G/LTE network 
testbed that is extremely reconfigurable and scalable. The entire open stack network was 
implemented with approximately $3000 of equipment that could fit into a single Pelican 
1510 case. As the 5G NR standards change to reflect new releases or even when 6G or 7G 
standards are developed, the same equipment can be reconfigured to create a modern 
cellular network. These qualities make using an open stack network ideal for integration 
into various backhaul infrastructures such as the Naval Operational Architecture. It is also 
beneficial for experimental and other purposes to have complete control over the security 
and operational aspects of the network, without heavy reliance on third-party support. 
One of the most significant impediments to implementing the 4G LTE network was 
properly configuring subscriber information in the USIM application. As such, a major 
contribution of this work is providing updated guidance on SIM programming utilities and 
requirements for 4G/5G SIM cards. Certain applications, such as pySIM, are useful for 
reading the SIM or USIM application but have limited capabilities for writing data into the 
USIM application. On the other hand, the OYEITIMES SIM card programmer was capable 
of writing data into the USIM application but lacked some of the reader functionality seen 
in the pySIM program. 
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To better understand the mobile telephony security landscape, existing cyber-attack 
taxonomies were investigated and evaluated. After additional research into the 5G 
standards, a novel attack vector categorization scheme was developed and published in the 
IEEE Computer Society Computer magazine [5]. The framework is useful for analyzing 
attack vectors, rather than attack methods, and how they are enabled or defeated by mobile 
telephony security mechanisms. The authors believe that their novel categorization 
scheme, focusing on CUPS, is an effective method for reapplying legacy attack methods 
to modern mobile networks. 
While implementing the open stack network, the concept of a spoofed-network 
attack vector was simultaneously developed and investigated. Such an attack vector is 
agnostic to the RAN and CN because it could be applied to any generation of mobile 
telephony standards. Key aspects of this attack vector were demonstrated, including the 
implementation of a 4G LTE network and the reading of critical subscriber information 
from the USIM application. Some limitations of this attack vector include the requirement 
that the target UE be within coverage range of the spoofed RAN and the limited function 
set provided in open-source network deployment. Additionally, the mechanism to recover 
the master key from the CK and IK stored on the USIM requires significant computational 
power and knowledge of the OP. 
 FUTURE WORK 
The open stack network concept and spoofed network attack vector are presented 
only in a 4G LTE network due to 5G software unavailability. As the RAN and CN software 
finishes their testing stage, the open network deployment should be revisited for 5G NR 
networks. In addition to upgrading the utilities required for 5G open networks, several other 
items of future work are outlined. 
One of the major hurdles encountered in the development of the 4G LTE open stack 
network was finding an existing capability to program the subscriber credentials in the 
USIM application. While multiple tools can be used to read the SIM or USIM application 
data, few were able to program the USIM. None of the SIM or USIM writer tools 
investigated can alter the service tables to configure 5G capabilities. Since the SIM and 
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USIM applications follow a rigid structure outlined in 3GPP technical documents, the 
open-source pySim tool could be upgraded with the additional functionality needed to 
generate 5G capable UICCs.  
An additional goal for a new SIM card tool would be to automate the programming 
of the USIM application onto the UICC. Many of the UICCs available do not come with 
the USIM application installed which renders them useless for modern networks. By 
programming the USIM application on older UICCs, older resources can be repurposed. 
Furthermore, research into the process required to install the USIM application onto the 
UICC may reveal additional security vulnerabilities in the UICC environment. 
Until the OSA software for 5G RAN and CN completes its testing stage, future 
work should focus on testing and implementing additional services to the 4G LTE open 
stack network. This would require attaching another COTS UE to attempt voice and data 
calls or messages within the network. The open stack network implemented in this thesis 
requires integration of a short message service center (SMSC) to support the short message 
service (SMS). Several open-source SMS gateways are available for this purpose, such as 
Jasmin SMS. With the aforementioned extension, the open stack network could be used in 
research on communications with unmanned vehicles. Such a demonstration would 
underscore the interdisciplinary research on unmanned vehicles at the Naval Postgraduate 
School and showcase the benefits to be accrued by integrating open stack networks into 
the Naval Operational Architecture. 
Once the 5G network software has completed testing, the next task will be to 
implement an open stack 5G SA network. Although a 5G NSA open stack network could 
be implemented with the currently available software from OSA, doing so would require 
additional hardware modifications to support wired connections to both the eNB and gNB. 
The primary benefit of 5G NSA architectures is for commercial providers and not 
necessarily research institutions. A thorough investigation of utilities required to 
implement the 5G SA open stack network and detailed guidance is critical for other 
teachers and students eager to study modern mobile networks. 
78 
The spoofed network attack vector described in this thesis requires exploitation of 
GNSS chipsets. One avenue for future work is to continue investigating vulnerabilities in 
GNSS chipsets to determine how to implement the proposed attack vector. After the attack 
vector is thoroughly detailed, the method could be applied to various cellular modems to 
determine the scope of the attack vector against commercial hardware. While the spoofed 
network attack vector should work against both 4G and 5G networks, employing it against 
a vulnerable COTS UE on both types of networks may reveal practical differences in 
results. 
Part of the benefit of the open stack network concept is that security researchers 
and academics can have low-cost access to an entire mobile network. Accessibility issues 
have previously precluded the CN from receiving the thorough security analysis afforded 
the RAN. With access to the entire network instead of just the RAN, future studies could 
investigate security vulnerabilities unique to the CN. Additionally, access to the RAN 
through weak security practices at the CN could be used to explore how legacy attack 
vectors could be applied to modern mobile networks. 
Finally, 5G NR will push data processing closer to the network edge. Doing so 
effectively will require the utilization of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/
ML) within the RAN. The open RAN (O-RAN) concept breaks down an eNB/gNB into 
three functional pieces to facilitate the introduction of AI/ML. Since the code for the OSA 
RAN is open source, it could be modified to include a layer for AI/ML. The RF and basic 
simulator could be used in conjunction with a cluster of low-cost computer nodes to test 
the response of the AI/ML algorithms to changing traffic and RF conditions. 
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APPENDIX A. GPS C/A CODE PHASE ASSIGNMENTS 
This table, adapted from Table 5.3 of [41], provides the information necessary to 
identify or reproduce the C/A signal from each unique GPS satellite. 




Code Delay Chips 
1 1           2 ⊕ 6 5 
2 2           3 ⊕ 7 6 
3 3           4 ⊕ 8 7 
4 4           5 ⊕ 9 8 
5 5           1 ⊕ 9 17 
6 6           2 ⊕ 10 18 
7 7           1 ⊕ 8 139 
8 8           2 ⊕ 9 140 
9 9           3 ⊕ 10 141 
10 10           2 ⊕ 3 251 
11 11           3 ⊕ 4 252 
12 12           5 ⊕ 6 254 
13 13           6 ⊕ 7 255 
14 14           7 ⊕ 8 256 
15 15           8 ⊕ 9 257 
16 16           9 ⊕ 10 258 
17 17           1 ⊕ 4 469 
18 18           2 ⊕ 5 470 
19 19           3 ⊕ 6 471 
20 20           4 ⊕ 7 472 
21 21           5 ⊕ 8 473 
22 22           6 ⊕ 9 474 
23 23           1 ⊕ 3 509 
24 24           4 ⊕ 6 512 
25 25           5 ⊕ 7 513 
26 26           6 ⊕ 8 514 
27 27           7 ⊕ 9 515 
28 28           8 ⊕ 10 516 
29 29           1 ⊕ 6 859 
30 30           2 ⊕ 7 860 
31 31           3 ⊕ 8 861 
32 32           4 ⊕ 9 862 
Reserved 33           5 ⊕ 10 863 
Reserved 34           4 ⊕ 10 950 
Reserved 35           1 ⊕ 7 947 
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Code Delay Chips 
Reserved 36           2 ⊕ 8 948 
Reserved 37           4 ⊕ 10 950 
 
81 
APPENDIX B. QUALCOMM COMPONENT-LEVEL 
VULNERABILITY CONSOLIDATED REPORTS 
This table consolidates the CVE reports identified in [1] as affecting Qualcomm 
components using information provided from National Vulnerability Database hosted by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology [42]. The two right-most columns 
indicate whether the vulnerability applies to the 9206 and 9607 product lines that are used 
in Quectel EC20 modems. 
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CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2235 
7.8 Buffer overflow occurs 
when emulated RPMB 
is used due to sector 
size assumptions in the 
TA rollback protection 
logic. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon 
Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and 
Networking in MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MDM9655, 
MSM8996AU, QCS404, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 410/12, SD 
425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 625, SD 
632, SD 636, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, 











Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon 
Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and 
Networking in IPQ8074, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, 
MDM9655, MSM8996AU, QCA8081, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 
410/12, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, 
SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 650/52, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 
670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 8CX, SDA660, SDM439, 
SDM630, SDM660, Snapdragon_High_Med_2016, SXR1130 
x x 
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CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2237 
5.5 Failure in taking 
appropriate action to 
handle the error case if 
keypad GPIO 
deactivation fails leads 
to silent failure 
scenario and 
subsequent logic gets 
executed every time. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer 
Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon 
Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile in MDM9206, MDM9607, 
MDM9650, MDM9655, QCS605, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 410/




7.8 Lack of check of data 
type can lead to 
subsequent loop-
expression potentially 
go negative and the 
condition will still 
evaluate true, leading 
to buffer underflow. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer 
Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon 
Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile in MDM9206, MDM9607, 
MDM9650, MDM9655, QCS605, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 410/




5.5 Sanity checks are 
missing in layout 
which can lead to SUI 
corruption or can lead 
to Denial of Service. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon 
Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and 
Networking in MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9635M, 
MDM9640, MDM9650, MDM9655, MSM8996AU, QCS404, 
QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 410/12, SD 
425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 615/16/
SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 650/52, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 
710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, 




CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2240 
5.5 While sending the 
rendered surface 
content to the screen, 
error handling is not 
properly checked, 
resulting in an 
unpredictable 
behavior. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon 
Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, 
Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired 
Infrastructure and Networking in IPQ4019, IPQ8064, IPQ8074, 
MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, 
MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, QCA6564, QCA6574, QCA6574AU, 
QCA6584, QCA6584AU, QCA8081, QCA9377, QCA9379, 
QCA9531, QCA9880, QCA9886, QCA9980, QCN5502, QCS404, 
QCS605, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 600, SD 625, SD 636, 
SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 
835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SD 8CX, SDA660, SDM630, 




5.5 While rendering the 
layout background, 
error status check is 
not caught properly 
and also incorrect 
status handling is being 
done, leading to 
unintended SUI 
behavior. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon 
Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in MDM9150, 
MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MDM9655, MSM8996AU, 
QCS404, QCS605, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 410/12, SD 636, SD 
675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, 




CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2253 
9.8 Buffer over-read can 
occur while parsing an 
ogg file with a 
corrupted comment 
block. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer 
IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, Snapdragon 
Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in 
MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MSM8909W, 
MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/
SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, 
SD 600, SD 615/16/SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 
675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, 





9.8 Position determination 
accuracy may be 
degraded due to 
wrongly decoded 
information. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, 
Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, 
MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9615, MDM9625, MDM9635M, 
MDM9640, MDM9650, MDM9655, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, 
QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, 
SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 615/16/SD 415, SD 
625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 650/52, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 
/ SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 





9.8 Possible out-of-bound 
read occurs while 
processing beaconing 
request due to lack of 
check on action frames 
received from user 
controlled space. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice 
& Music in MDM9607, MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, QCA6574AU, 
QCA9377, QCA9379, QCS405, QCS605, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, 
SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820A, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 
855, SDM630, SDM660, SDX24 
 x 
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CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2278 
7.8 User keystore 
signature is ignored in 
boot and can lead to 
bypass boot image 
signature verification. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Mobile in 
MDM9607, MDM9640, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 450, 





9.8 Out-of-bound access 
when reason code is 
extracted from frame 
data without validating 
the frame length. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon 
Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music in MDM9150, MDM9206, 
MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, 
QCA6574AU, QCA9377, QCA9379, QCS405, QCS605, SD 425, SD 
427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 450, SD 625, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 
712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / 




9.8 Possible integer 
underflow due to lack 
of validation before 
calculation of data 
length in 802.11 Rx 
management 
configuration. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon 
Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music in MDM9150, MDM9206, 
MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, 
QCA6574AU, QCA9377, QCA9379, QCS405, QCS605, SD 210/SD 
212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 450, SD 600, SD 
625, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, 
SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SDM630, 




7.8 User application could 
potentially make RPC 
call to the fastrpc 
driver and the driver 
will allow the message 
to go through to the 
remote subsystem. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial 
IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon 
Wearables in MDM9150, MDM9607, MDM9650, MSM8909W, 
MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 425, SD 427, 
SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, 
SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820A, SD 
835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SDA660, SDM439, SDM630, 
SDM660, SDX20, SDX24 
 x 
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CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2322 
9.8 Buffer overflow can 
occur when playing 
specific clip which is 
non-standard. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon 
IoT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon 
Wearables in MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, 
MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 
210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 
429, SD 450, SD 600, SD 615/16/SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, 
SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 
820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SDA660, SDM439, 




7.8 Data token is received 
from ADSP and is used 
without validation as 
an index into the array 
leads to out-of-bound 
access. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, 
Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon 
Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in 
MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, 
MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 
210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 
429, SD 450, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 
710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, 




9.8 Possible buffer 
overflow can occur 
when playing clip with 
incorrect element size. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, 
Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, 
MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, 
QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, 
SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 600, SD 615/
16/SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 
710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, 




CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2328 
7.8 Possible buffer 
overflow when number 
of channels passed is 
more than size of 
channel mapping 
array. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, 
Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, 
MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8909W, 
MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/
SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, 
SD 600, SD 615/16/SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 
675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, 





5.5 Improper input 
validation in allocation 
request for secure 
allocations can lead to 
page fault. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, 
Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & 
Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and 
Networking in IPQ4019, IPQ8064, IPQ8074, MDM9150, MDM9640, 
MDM9650, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, 
Qualcomm 215, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, 
SD 450, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 
/ SD 670, SD 730, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, 




7.5 Null pointer 
dereferencing can 
happen when playing 
the clip with wrong 
block group id. 
Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, 
Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon IoT, Snapdragon Mobile, 
Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, 
MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, 
QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, 
SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 600, SD 615/
16/SD 415, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 
710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, 




CVE # Severity Description Affected Models 9206 9607 
2019-
2346 
7.8 Firmware is getting 
into loop of 
overwriting memory 
when scan command is 
given from host 
because of improper 
validation. 
Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon 
Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, 
Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in IPQ8074, 
QCA8081, QCS404, QCS405, QCS605, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 
435, SD 450, SD 625, SD 636, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 820, 
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APPENDIX C. QUECTEL PRODUCT BROCHURES 
The Quectel EC20 product line has been discontinued after the release of revision 
2.1 modems. Table 15 concatenates relevant LTE parameters into a single table for 
comparison between the EC20 revision 1 and 2.1. 
Table 15. EC20 LTE Parameters by Revision. Adapted from [27] and 
[29]. 
Parameter Revision 1 Revision 2.1 
LTE Bands FDD: B1/B3/B5/B7/B8/B20 FDD: B1/B3/B5/B8 
TDD: B34/B38/B39/B40/B41 
LTE Version 3GPP E-UTRA Release 9 3GPP LTE Release 11 
Max Data Rate 
Downlink 
FDD: 100 Mbps FDD: 150 Mbps 
TDD: 130 Mbps 
Max Data Rate 
Uplink 
FDD: 50 Mbps FDD: 50 Mbps 
TDD: 30 Mbps 
Output Power 23 dBm +/- 2dB 23 dBm +/- 2dB 
Sensitivity FDD B1: -97 dBm 
FDD B3: -96 dBm 
FDD B5: -99 dBm 
FDD B7: -97 dBm 
FDD B8: -98 dBm 
FDD B20: -96 dBm 
FDD B1: -101.6 dBm 
FDD B3: -101.9 dBm 
FDD B5: -102 dBm 
FDD B8: -102.1 dBm 
TDD B34: -101 dBm 
TDD B38: -101.3 dBm 
TDD B39: -101.2 dBm 
TDD B40: -101.4 dBm 




Enhanced AT commands 
3GPP TS27.007 
Enhanced AT commands 
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APPENDIX D. USRP B200 DATASHEET 
This appendix contains relevant data about the USRP B200 and B210 (Table 16). 
Table 16. USRP B200 and B210 Product Specifications. Adapted 
from [43]. 
Parameter USRP B200 USRP B210 
Channels 1 Tx & 1 Rx 2 TX & 2 Rx 
FPGA Xilinx Spartan 6 
XC6SLX75 
Xilinx Spartan 6 
XC6SLX150 
Instantaneous Bandwidth 56 MHz 56 MHz in 1x1 
30.72 MHz in 2x2 
Frequency Coverage 70 MHz - 6 GHz 70 MHz - 6 GHz 
Power Output Over 10 dBm Over 10 dBm 
Receiver Noise Figure Less than 8 dB Less than 8 dB 
Max ADC/DAC Sample 
Rate 
61.44 MS/s 61.44 MS/s 
ADC/DAC Resolution 12 bits 12 bits 
94 
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APPENDIX E. OAI EPC SOFTWARE INSTALLATION GUIDE 
Section III.B.4 details the steps required to configure a host machine kernel for 
usage with the OAI EPC software. This appendix provides a detailed guide for each of the 
steps required to install and configure the OAI EPC software that are overviewed in Section 
III.B.5. The steps shown reflect a specific configuration of the OAI EPC with the Quectel
EC20 UE and may require changes for other open stack network implementations.
 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL DOCKER SET-UP 
Install Docker 
1. Remove any old docker files if applicable
sudo apt-get remove docker docker-engine docker.io containerd runc 
2. Set-up the Docker repository
sudo apt-get update 
sudo apt-get install apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl gnupg-agent \ software-
properties-common 
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/
share/keyrings/docker-archive-keyring.gpg 
echo \ “deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/docker-archive-keyring.gpg] 
https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu \ $(lsb_release -cs) stable” | sudo tee 
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list > /dev/null 
3. Install the Docker engine
sudo apt-get update 
sudo apt-get install docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io 
4. Create a Docker hub account
5. Add the user to Docker group so that future commands do not require
“sudo.” In this step, replace $USER with the actual username. After
completion, the user must log out, then log back in before continuing.
sudo groupadd docker 
sudo usermod -a -G docker $USER 
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6. Verify Docker installation with “Hello World” example 
docker run hello-world 
 
Check Python version 
1. The installed Python version must be at least 3.6, which can be checked 
with the following command: 
python3 –version 
2. If this condition is not met, then use the package manager to update or 
install Python version 3.0 with: 
sudo apt-get install python3 
 
Pull Base Images 
1. If not already done, log into the user’s Docker account 
2. Pull the base images for Ubuntu 18.04 and Cassandra 
docker pull ubuntu:bionic 
 
docker pull Cassandra:2.1 
3. If desired, the user may now logout of their Docker account 
 
Network Configuration 
1. Enable IP address forwarding 
sudo sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.forwarding=1 
 
sudo iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
 
In /etc/sysctl.conf, uncomment the line net.ipv4.ip_forward 
 
sudo sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.conf 
 
Reboot the machine 
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2. Verify that IP forwarding is enabled by checking that the following
command outputs a 1.
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward 
3. Alter the Docker network bridge to an IP address on the local network




4. Restart the Docker daemon for the changes to take effect
sudo service docker restart 
docker info 
docker network inspect bridge 
BUILD IMAGES 
The series of commands required to create each of the EPC network function image 
files are consolidated in the script “Create_4G_Images.sh.” The script only requires an 
initial clone of the OAI EPC repository. 
1. Clone the OAI EPC repository
git clone https://github.com/OPENAIRINTERFACE/openair-epc-fed.git 
2. Change directories to the downloaded openair-epc-fed folder
cd openair-epc-fed 
3. Change desired branch to master and synchronize files with the repository
git checkout master 
git pull origin master 
./scripts/syncComponents.sh
4. Build the HSS image
docker build --target oai-hss –tag oai-hss:production --file component/oai-hss/docker/
Dockerfile.ubuntu18.04 component/oai-hss 
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docker image prune --force 
 
docker image ls 
5. Build the MME image. This image is the only one that appears to stall for 
a significant period of time while building. The stall occurs around step 13 
and 14, but it will successfully build if left alone. 
docker build --target oai-mme –tag oai-mme:production --file component/oai-mme/
docker/Dockerfile.ubuntu18.04 component/oai-mme 
 
docker image prune --force 
 
docker image ls 
6. Build SPGWC  
docker build --target oai-spgwc --tag oai-spgwc:production --file component/oai-spgwc/
docker/Dockerfile.ubuntu18.04 component/oai-spgwc 
 
docker image prune --force 
 
docker image ls 
7. Build SPGWU  
docker build --target oai-spgwu --tag oai-spgwu:production --file component/oai-spgwu/
docker/Dockerfile.ubuntu18.04 component/oai-spgwu 
 
docker image prune --force 
 
docker image ls 
 
 CREATE AND CONFIGURE CONTAINERS 
The series of commands required to create each of the EPC network function 
containers are consolidated in the script “Configure_4G_Containers.sh.” The first three 
steps are not included in the script. The first step creates a network within the docker 
environment for the containers to communicate with each other. This step only needs to be 
completed once. The second step creates a route on the eNB machine to the OAI EPC 
network on the EPC machine. The third step is not required but is provided as a set of 
99 
commands that can be used to permanently rename modern-style network interfaces to 
their more classical “eth0” style. 
1. Create a network for the OAI EPC containers 
docker network create --attachable --subnet 192.168.61.0/26 --ip-range 192.168.61.0/26 
prod-oai-public-net 
2. Create a route for the eNB to reach the EPC containers. 
sudo ip route add 192.168.61.0/26 via 192.168.17.1 dev eth0 
3. If desired, rename network interfaces similar to “enp0s25” to the more 
classical “eth0” style 
sudo nano /etc/default/grub 
 
Edit the line GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=“” to: 
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=“net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0” 
 
sudo grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg 
 
Restart the computer 
4. Create each container. This is the step where the 
“Configure_4G_Containers.sh” script begins and where a different 
approach for permanent deployment of the containers could be followed. 
docker run --name prod-cassandra -d -e CASSANDRA_CLUSTER_NAME=“OAI HSS 
Cluster” -e CASSANDRA_ENDPOINT_SNITCH=GossipingPropertyFileSnitch 
cassandra:2.1 
 
docker run --privileged --name prod-oai-hss -d --entrypoint /bin/bash oai-hss:production -
c “sleep infinity” 
 
docker network connect prod-oai-public-net prod-oai-hss 
 
docker run --privileged --name prod-oai-mme --network prod-oai-public-net -d --
entrypoint /bin/bash oai-mme:production -c “sleep infinity” 
 
docker run --privileged --name prod-oai-spgwc --network prod-oai-public-net -d --
entrypoint /bin/bash oai-spgwc:production -c “sleep infinity” 
 
docker run --privileged --name prod-oai-spgwu-tiny --network prod-oai-public-net -d --
entrypoint /bin/bash oai-spgwu-tiny:production -c “sleep infinity” 
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5. Configure the Cassandra container 
docker cp component/oai-hss/src/hss_rel14/db/oai_db.cql prod-cassandra:/home 
 






docker exec -it prod-cassandra /bin/bash -c “cqlsh --file /home/oai_db.cql 
${Cassandra_IP}” 
6. Configure the HSS container 
HSS_IP=`docker exec -it prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “ifconfig eth1 | grep inet” | sed -f ./ci-
scripts/convertIpAddrFromIfconfig.sed` 
 
python3 component/oai-hss/ci-scripts/generateConfigFiles.py --kind=HSS --
cassandra=${Cassandra_IP} \ 
--hss_s6a=${HSS_IP} --apn1=apn1.carrier.com \ 
--apn2=NPS4G.apn.epc.mnc092.mcc404.3gppnetwork.org \ 





docker cp ./hss-cfg.sh prod-oai-hss:/openair-hss/scripts 
 
docker exec -it prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “cd /openair-hss/scripts && chmod 777 hss-
cfg.sh && ./hss-cfg.sh” 









python3 component/oai-mme/ci-scripts/generateConfigFiles.py --kind=MME \ 
--hss_s6a=${HSS_IP} --mme_s6a=${MME_IP} \ 
--mme_s1c_IP=${MME_IP} --mme_s1c_name=eth0 \ 
--mme_s10_IP=${MME_IP} --mme_s10_name=eth0 \ 
--mme_s11_IP=${MME_IP} --mme_s11_name=eth0 \ 
--spgwc0_s11_IP=${SPGW0_IP} \ 
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--mcc=404--mnc=92 --tac_list=“5 6 7” --from_docker_file 
 
docker cp ./mme-cfg.sh prod-oai-mme:/openair-mme/scripts 
 
docker exec -it prod-oai-mme /bin/bash -c “cd /openair-mme/scripts && chmod 777 
mme-cfg.sh && ./mme-cfg.sh” 
8. Configure the SPGW-C container 
python3 component/oai-spgwc/ci-scripts/generateConfigFiles.py --kind=SPGW-C \ 
--s11c=eth0 --sxc=eth0 --apn=apn1.carrier.com \ 
--dns1_ip=172.20.20.12 --dns2_ip=8.8.8.8 --from_docker_file 
 
docker cp ./spgwc-cfg.sh prod-oai-spgwc:/openair-spgwc 
 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwc /bin/bash -c “cd /openair-spgwc && chmod 777 spgwc-
cfg.sh && ./spgwc-cfg.sh” 
9. Configure the SPGW-U-tiny container 
python3 component/oai-spgwu-tiny/ci-scripts/generateConfigFiles.py --kind=SPGW-U \ 
--sxc_ip_addr=${SPGW0_IP} --sxu=eth0 --s1u=eth0 \ 
--network_ue_nat_option=yes --from_docker_file 
 
docker cp ./spgwu-cfg.sh prod-oai-spgwu-tiny:/openair-spgwu-tiny 
 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwu-tiny /bin/bash -c “cd /openair-spgwu-tiny && chmod 777 
spgwu-cfg.sh && ./spgwu-cfg.sh” 
 
 START NETWORK FUNCTIONS 
The series of commands required to start the network functions requires a specific 
ordering: HSS, MME, SPGW-C, and SPGW-U-tiny. These commands initialize the 
network functions and start packet captures in each container. Additionally, a colored 
display of the MME log is printed to the screen. The script that contains these commands 
is “Launch_4G_Containers.sh.” 
1. Launch tshark in each container to start packet captures 
docker exec -d prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “nohup tshark -i eth0 -i eth1 -w /tmp/
hss_check_run.pcap 2>&1 > /dev/null” 
 
docker exec -d prod-oai-mme /bin/bash -c “nohup tshark -i eth0 -i lo:s10 -w /tmp/
mme_check_run.pcap 2>&1 > /dev/null” 
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docker exec -d prod-oai-spgwc /bin/bash -c “nohup tshark -i eth0 -i lo:p5c -i lo:s5c -w 
/tmp/spgwc_check_run.pcap 2>&1 > /dev/null” 
 
docker exec -d prod-oai-spgwu-tiny /bin/bash -c “nohup tshark -i eth0 -w /tmp/
spgwu_check_run.pcap 2>&1 > /dev/null” 
2. Launch each network function 
docker exec -d prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “nohup ./bin/oai_hss -j ./etc/hss_rel14.json --









docker exec -d prod-oai-spgwc /bin/bash -c “nohup ./bin/oai_spgwc -o -c ./etc/




docker exec -d prod-oai-spgwu-tiny /bin/bash -c “nohup ./bin/oai_spgwu -o -c ./etc/
spgw_u.conf > spgwu_check_run.log 2>&1” 
3. Print the running MME log to screen 
docker exec -it prod-oai-mme tail -f mme_check_run.log 
 
 STOPPING NETWORK FUNCTIONS 
The series of commands required to stop the network functions requires the same 
ordering as the commands to start the network functions: HSS, MME, SPGW-C, and 
SPGW-U-tiny. These commands stop the network functions by sending each container a 
“killall” signal twice. Additionally, the logs, configuration files, and packet captures are 
consolidated into a compressed archive folder, which must be renamed after executing the 
script to prevent the archive from being overwritten. The script is called 
“Stop_4G_Containers.sh.” 
1. Send the “killall” signal to each container twice 
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docker exec -it prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGINT oai_hss tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-mme /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGINT oai_mme tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwc /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGINT oai_spgwc tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwu-tiny /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGINT oai_spgwu 
tshark tcpdump” 
sleep 10 
docker exec -it prod-oai-hss /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGKILL oai_hss tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-mme /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGKILL oai_mme tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwc /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGKILL oai_spgwc tshark 
tcpdump” 
docker exec -it prod-oai-spgwu-tiny /bin/bash -c “killall --signal SIGKILL oai_spgwu 
tshark tcpdump” 
2. Remove the old archive folder and create a new archive folder
rm -Rf archives 
mkdir -p archives/oai-hss-cfg archives/oai-mme-cfg archives/oai-spgwc-cfg archives/oai-
spgwu-cfg 
3. Copy the configurations, logs, and packet captures into the new archive
docker cp prod-oai-hss:/openair-hss/etc/. archives/oai-hss-cfg 
docker cp prod-oai-mme:/openair-mme/etc/. archives/oai-mme-cfg 
docker cp prod-oai-spgwc:/openair-spgwc/etc/. archives/oai-spgwc-cfg 
docker cp prod-oai-spgwu-tiny:/openair-spgwu-tiny/etc/. archives/oai-spgwu-cfg 
docker cp prod-oai-hss:/openair-hss/hss_check_run.log archives 
docker cp prod-oai-mme:/openair-mme/mme_check_run.log archives 
docker cp prod-oai-spgwc:/openair-spgwc/spgwc_check_run.log archives 
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docker cp prod-oai-spgwu-tiny:/openair-spgwu-tiny/spgwu_check_run.log archives 
 
docker cp prod-oai-hss:/tmp/hss_check_run.pcap archives 
 
docker cp prod-oai-mme:/tmp/mme_check_run.pcap archives 
 
docker cp prod-oai-spgwc:/tmp/spgwc_check_run.pcap archives 
 
docker cp prod-oai-spgwu-tiny:/tmp/spgwu_check_run.pcap archives 
4. Compress the newly created archive for storage 
zip -r -qq docker_files.zip archives 
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APPENDIX F. DIAGPARSER AND MINICOM GUIDE 
This appendix summarizes a series of commands originally presented in an ECE 
department laboratory that explored the EC20 modem. These commands are divided into 
four sections: the first to capture packets from the modem, the second to send and receive 
AT commands, the third to configure GNSS functions, and the fourth to access the Linux 
OS on the modem. 
 CONFIGURE PACKET CAPTURE 
1. In a terminal window, run “nc -u -l -p 4729” 
2. In a second terminal, run “sudo wireshark -I lo -f ‘port 4729’ -k 
 SEND AND RECEIVE MODEM-LEVEL COMMANDS 
1. Open a terminal window and launch the minicom utility with “sudo 
minicom -s.” Within the utility, select “setup” and change the path to 
“/dev/ttyUSB0.” Escape and exit the menu. The raw byte level messages 
from the modem will now display on the screen. 
2. In a second terminal window, change directory to the DiagParser utility 
with “cd ~/diag_parser.” Run the utility with “sudo ./diag_parser -g 
127.0.0.1 -i /dev/ttyUSB0 -v” to decode the packets received by the 
modem. 
3. In a third terminal window, run “sudo minicom -s.” Select “setup” and 
change the device path to “/dev/ttyUSB2.” Escape and exit the menu. The 
modem will attempt to execute its initialization AT commands. To make 
the user input visible, type “ATE1” and hit the return key. 
 CONFIGURE GNSS FUNCTIONALITY 
1. After configuring the modem to send and receive AT commands, type 
“AT+QGPS=1” and hit return. The modem should respond with “ok.” 
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2. Open a new terminal window and run “sudo minicom -s.” Select “setup” 
and change the device path to “/dev/ttyUSB1.” Escape and exit the menu. 
The modem will display NMEA data in the terminal window. 
 ACCESS MODEM EMBEDDED LINUX OS 
1. Open a terminal window and run “sudo adb start-server.” 
2. In the same window, run “sudo minicom -s,” select “setup” and change the 
device path to “/dev/ttyUSB2.” 
3. Once the modem has completed its initial set of AT commands, type 
“ATE1” and hit return to make user-input visible. Then enter the 
following command 
4. AT+QLINUXCMD=“/usr/bin/usb_uartdiag” 
5. Once executed the previous command will cause minicom to display 
“Cannot open /dev/ttyUSB2!.” 
6. In a new terminal, run “adb shell” to enter the Linux OS on the modem. 
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APPENDIX G. NETWORK TESTING FILE GUIDE 
This appendix contains a guide to the network tests performed for this thesis and 
the file structure used to store the data gathered from each test. 
 FILE STRUCTURE 
Oai-hss-cfg 
• “acl.conf”: Configuration file for peer whitelist extension 
• “cacert.pem”: CA certificate file 
• "hss.cert.pem”: Signed certificate and HSS public key 
• “hss.key.pem”: HSS private key (RSA) 
• “hss_rel14.conf”: Contains IP address for the Cassandra server (MySQL) 
• “hss_rel14_fd.conf”: Free Diameter configuration information for HSS 
including preferences for TCP/SCTP, listening IP address and port 
numbers 
• “hss_rel14.json”: Information for connecting HSS to docker bridge 
including the username/password for the VHSS database 
• “oss.json”: Configuration information for logging structure 
Oai-mme-cfg 
• “mme.cacert.pem”: CA certificate file 
• “mme.cakey.pem”: MME certificate private key 
• “mme.cert.pem”: Signed certificate and MME public key 
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• “mme.conf”: Configuration file, including interface IP addresses, allowed 
PLMNs, max number of UE/eNBs, emergency signaling provisioning, 
logging preferences galore 
• “mme_fd.conf”: Free Diameter configuration information for MME 
including an option for TLS security in connection with HSS 
• “mme.key.pem”: MME private key (RSA) 
Oai-spgwc-cfg 
• “spgw_c.conf”: configuration file for SPGW-C, including UE address 
pool and primary/secondary DNS servers 
Oai-spgwu-cfg 
• “spgw_u.conf”: configuration file for SPGW-U, including NAT option 











 NETWORK TESTING ARCHIVE GUIDE 
No. Description Components RF and Networking HW 
1 No connectivity between 
UE/eNB 
UE/eNB B200/X310 respectively; 
SMA connected with 30 dB 
attenuator 
2 eNB fail to attach UE/eNB  B200/X310 respectively; 
SMA connected with 30 dB 
attenuator 
3 UE attach to eNB, but RX gain 
too high 
UE/eNB B200/X310 respectively; 
SMA connected with 30 dB 
attenuator 
4 Multiple attach/detach until 
finally UE attaches to eNB 
UE/eNB B200/X310 respectively; 
SMA connected with 30 dB 
attenuator 
5 No RF full system attach and 
connect; UE unable to ping 
Internet 
UE/eNB/EPC Laptops only via Ethernet 
switch 
6 No RF full system attach and 
connect; successful UE ping 
Internet 
UE/eNB/EPC Laptops only via Ethernet 
switch; EPC as NAT from 
eth0<->wlan0 
7 RF over SMA cables; 
successful UE connect/attach 
and ping to Internet 
UE/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
UE to eNB via USRPS via 
SMA with 30 dB attenuator; 
EPC as NAT from eth0<-
>wlan0 
8 RF over SMA cables; UE 
attach rejected (T-Mobile and 
Netherlands SIMs) 
EC20/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
EC20 to eNB (USRP B200) 
via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; 
Netherlands KPN Mobile 
SIM 
9 RF over SMA cables; UE 
attach rejected (My 404/92 
SIM) 
EC20/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
EC20 to eNB (USRP B200) 
via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; My 
404/92 Programmed SIM 
10 RF over SMA cables; UE 
attach rejected (My 404/92 
SIM) after fixing SPGWC 
EC20/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
EC20 to eNB (USRP B200) 
via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; My 
404/92 Programmed SIM 
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11 RF over SMA cables; 
successful soft UE 
connect/attach and ping to 
Internet 
UE/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
soft UE to eNB (USRP 
B200) via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; My 
404/92 Programmed SIM 
12 RF over SMA cables; 
successful soft UE 
connect/attach and ping to 
Internet without nokrnmod 
flag 
UE/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
soft UE to eNB (USRP 
B200) via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; My 
404/92 Programmed SIM 
13 RF over SMA cables; 
successful soft UE 
connect/attach and ping to 
Internet with old nasmesh 
kernel option 
UE/eNB/EPC eNB and EPC via Ethernet; 
soft UE to eNB (USRP 
B200) via SMA with 30 dB 
attenuator; EPC as NAT 
from eth0<->wlan0; My 
404/92 Programmed SIM 
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APPENDIX H. USRP SOFTWARE GUIDE 
The following code is used to provide vendor information for several USRP devices 
to the OS. This information is used to inform the OS how to interact with the USRP over 
the USB connection. The file is created and saved at “/etc/udev/rules.d/10-usrp.rules”. 
#  
# Copyright 2011,2015 Ettus Research LLC  
#  
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify  
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by  
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or  
# (at your option) any later version.  
#  
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,  
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of  
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the  
# GNU General Public License for more details.  
#  
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License  
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  
#   
#USRP1  
SUBSYSTEMS==“usb,” ATTRS{idVendor}==“fffe,” ATTRS{idProduct}==“0002,” 
MODE:=“0666”   
#B100  
SUBSYSTEMS==“usb,” ATTRS{idVendor}==“2500,” ATTRS{idProduct}==“0002,” 
MODE:=“0666”   
#B200  
SUBSYSTEMS==“usb,” ATTRS{idVendor}==“2500,” ATTRS{idProduct}==“0020,” 
MODE:=“0666”  
SUBSYSTEMS==“usb,” ATTRS{idVendor}==“2500,” ATTRS{idProduct}==“0022,” 
MODE:=“0666”  
SUBSYSTEMS==“usb,” ATTRS{idVendor}==“3923,” ATTRS{idProduct}==“7813,” 
MODE:=“0666”  
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APPENDIX I. EC20 MODEM AT COMMANDS 
This appendix contains the output from execution of the AT+CLAC command via 
the minicom utility and lists all commands that can be executed by the EC20. While 
documentation of some commands is provided by Quectel, many commands do not have 
provided documentation. Of these undocumented commands, some can be deduced 
through other resources such as [38]. The remaining commands are likely proprietary to 
either Qualcomm or Quectel. The results are presented in three columns and exclude the 





































































































































































































































APPENDIX J. EC20 NETWORK OPERATOR LIST 
This appendix contains the output from execution of the AT+COPN command via 
the minicom utility and lists all MNOs stored on the EC20. The results are presented in 
two columns. Each entry contains the PLMN of the MNO and the operator name in long 
alphanumeric format. Although not shown, some MNOs have an additional shot 
alphanumeric format to facilitate displaying on the UE. 
 
+COPN: "00011","Uganda Telecom" 
+COPN: "00011","INX Inmarsat" 
+COPN: "00101","Test PLMN 1-1" 
+COPN: "00102","Test PLMN 1-2" 
+COPN: "00201","Test PLMN 2-1" 
+COPN: "20201","GR COSMOTE" 
+COPN: "20201","GR COSMOTE" 
+COPN: "20205","vodafone GR" 
+COPN: "20210","WIND GR" 
+COPN: "20210","WIND GR" 
+COPN: "20210","WIND GR" 
+COPN: "20404","vodafone NL" 
+COPN: "20404","vodafone NL" 
+COPN: "20408","NL KPN" 
+COPN: "20408","NL KPN" 
+COPN: "20412","NL Telfort" 
+COPN: "20416","T-Mobile NL" 
+COPN: "20416","T-Mobile NL" 
+COPN: "20420","Orange NL" 
+COPN: "20601","BEL PROXIMUS" 
+COPN: "20601","BEL PROXIMUS" 
+COPN: "20610","B Mobistar" 
+COPN: "20610","B mobistar" 
+COPN: "20610","B mobistar" 
+COPN: "20620","BASE" 
+COPN: "20620","BASE" 
+COPN: "20801","Orange F" 
+COPN: "20801","Orange F" 
+COPN: "20801","Orange F" 
+COPN: "20802","F - Contact" 
+COPN: "20802","F - Contact" 
+COPN: "20810","F SFR" 
+COPN: "20810","F SFR" 
+COPN: "20810","F SFR" 
+COPN: "20813","F - Contact" 









+COPN: "20888","F - Contact" 






+COPN: "21401","Vodafone ES" 
+COPN: "21401","Vodafone ES" 








+COPN: "21601","Telenor HU" 
+COPN: "21601","Telenor HU" 
+COPN: "21601","Telenor HU" 
+COPN: "21630","T-Mobile H" 
+COPN: "21630","T-Mobile H" 
+COPN: "21670","vodafone HU" 
+COPN: "21670","vodafone HU" 
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+COPN: "21803","HT ERONET" 
+COPN: "21805","m:tel" 
+COPN: "21805","m:tel" 
+COPN: "21890","BH Mobile" 
+COPN: "21890","BHMobile" 
+COPN: "21890","BHMobile" 
+COPN: "21901","T-Mobile HR" 
+COPN: "21902","Tele2 HR" 
+COPN: "21910","HR VIP" 
+COPN: "22001","Telenor SRB" 






+COPN: "22004","T-Mobile CG" 
+COPN: "22005","Vip SRB" 
+COPN: "22005","Vip SRB" 
+COPN: "22005","Vip SRB" 
+COPN: "22201","I TIM" 
+COPN: "22201","I TIM" 
+COPN: "22201","I TIM" 
+COPN: "22210","vodafone IT" 
+COPN: "22210","vodafone IT" 
+COPN: "22288","I WIND" 
+COPN: "22288","I WIND" 
+COPN: "22299","3 ITA" 
+COPN: "22601","RO Vodafone RO" 
+COPN: "22601","RO Vodafone RO" 
+COPN: "22601","RO Vodafone RO" 
+COPN: "22603","RO COSMOTE" 
+COPN: "22603","RO COSMOTE" 
+COPN: "22605","RO Digi.Mobil" 
+COPN: "22610","RO ORANGE" 







+COPN: "22803","orange CH" 
+COPN: "22807","In&Phone" 
+COPN: "22808","CHE  Tele2 
Switzerland" 
+COPN: "22815","OnAir" 
+COPN: "23001","T-Mobile CZ" 
+COPN: "23001","T-Mobile CZ" 
+COPN: "23002","O2 - CZ" 
+COPN: "23002","O2 - CZ" 
+COPN: "23003","Vodafone CZ" 
+COPN: "23003","Vodafone CZ" 
+COPN: "23101","Orange SK" 
+COPN: "23101","Orange SK" 
+COPN: "23102","Telekom SK" 
+COPN: "23102","Telekom SK" 
+COPN: "23102","Telekom SK" 
+COPN: "23106","O2 - SK" 




+COPN: "23203","T-Mobile Austria" 
+COPN: "23203","T-Mobile Austria" 
+COPN: "23203","T-Mobile Austria" 
+COPN: "23205","Orange AT" 
+COPN: "23205","Orange AT" 
+COPN: "23207","tele - ring" 
+COPN: "23207","tele - ring" 
+COPN: "23207","tele - ring" 
+COPN: "23210","3 AT" 
+COPN: "23212","Orange AT" 




+COPN: "23407","Cable&Wireless UK" 
+COPN: "23409","PMN UK" 
+COPN: "23410","O2 - UK" 
+COPN: "23410","O2 - UK" 
+COPN: "23410","O2 - UK" 
+COPN: "23410","O2 - UK" 
+COPN: "23415","vodafone UK" 
+COPN: "23415","vodafone UK" 
+COPN: "23416","Opal UK" 
+COPN: "23419","PMN UK" 












+COPN: "23455","C&W (SURE)" 
+COPN: "23455","C&W (SURE)" 
+COPN: "23455","C&W (SURE)" 
+COPN: "23458","Manx Telecom" 
+COPN: "23458","Manx Telecom" 
+COPN: "23801","TDC Mobil" 
+COPN: "23801","TDC Mobil" 
+COPN: "23801","TDC Mobil" 
+COPN: "23802","Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23802","Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23806","3 DK" 
+COPN: "23820","TELIA DK" 
+COPN: "23820","TELIA DK" 
+COPN: "23866","Telia Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23866","Telia Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23866","Telia Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23877","Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "23877","Telenor DK" 
+COPN: "24001","TELIA S" 
+COPN: "24001","TELIA S" 
+COPN: "24002","3 SE" 
+COPN: "24004","SWEDEN" 
+COPN: "24005","Sweden 3G" 
+COPN: "24007","Tele2 SE" 
+COPN: "24008","Telenor SE" 
+COPN: "24008","Telenor SE" 
+COPN: "24008","Telenor SE" 
+COPN: "24010","SpringMobil SE" 
+COPN: "24010","SpringMobil SE" 
+COPN: "24024","Sweden Mobile" 
+COPN: "24024","Sweden Mobile" 
+COPN: "24201","N Telenor" 
+COPN: "24201","N Telenor" 
+COPN: "24202","N NetCom" 
+COPN: "24202","N NetCom" 
+COPN: "24203","MTU" 
+COPN: "24204","Mobile Norway" 
+COPN: "24205","Mobile Norway" 
+COPN: "24205","Mobile Norway" 
+COPN: "24403","DNA" 
+COPN: "24403","DNA" 
+COPN: "24405","FI elisa" 
+COPN: "24405","FI elisa" 




+COPN: "24414","FI AMT" 
+COPN: "24491","FI SONERA" 
+COPN: "24491","FI SONERA" 
+COPN: "24601","OMNITEL LT" 
+COPN: "24602","LT BITE GSM" 
+COPN: "24602","LT BITE GSM" 
+COPN: "24603","Tele2 LT" 
+COPN: "24603","Tele2 LT" 
+COPN: "24701","LV LMT" 
+COPN: "24701","LV LMT" 
+COPN: "24701","LV LMT" 
+COPN: "24702","Tele2 LV" 
+COPN: "24702","Tele2 LV" 
+COPN: "24705","BITE LV" 
+COPN: "24705","BITE LV" 
+COPN: "24705","BITE LV" 
+COPN: "24801","EE EMT" 
+COPN: "24801","EE EMT" 
+COPN: "24801","EE EMT" 
+COPN: "24802","EE elisa" 
+COPN: "24802","EE elisa" 
+COPN: "24802","EE elisa" 
+COPN: "24803","Tele2 EE" 
+COPN: "24803","Tele2 EE" 
+COPN: "25001","MTS-RUS" 
+COPN: "25001","MTS-RUS" 
+COPN: "25002","MegaFon RUS" 







+COPN: "25007","RUS 07, RUS 
SMARTS" 
+COPN: "25007","RUS 07, RUS 
SMARTS" 
+COPN: "25010","RUS DTC" 
+COPN: "25012","ROSTELECOM" 
+COPN: "25012","ROSTELECOM" 
+COPN: "25013","RUS Kuban-GSM" 
+COPN: "25013","RUS Kuban-GSM" 
+COPN: "25015","RUS15, RUS 
SMARTS" 
+COPN: "25016","RUS16,250 16" 
+COPN: "25016","RUS16,250 16" 
+COPN: "25017","ROSTELECOM" 
+COPN: "25017","ROSTELECOM" 
+COPN: "25019","RUS INDIGO" 
+COPN: "25020","TELE2" 
+COPN: "25020","TELE2 RU" 








+COPN: "25501","MTS UKR" 
+COPN: "25501","MTS UKR" 
+COPN: "25502","Beeline UA" 







+COPN: "25701","BY VELCOM" 
+COPN: "25701","BY VELCOM" 
+COPN: "25702","MTS BY" 
+COPN: "25702","MTS BY" 
+COPN: "25704","life:) BY" 
+COPN: "25704","life:) BY" 
+COPN: "25704","life:) BY" 
+COPN: "25901","Orange MD" 
+COPN: "25902","MD MOLDCELL" 
+COPN: "25904","MDA EVENTIS" 







+COPN: "26003","Orange PL" 
+COPN: "26003","Orange PL" 










+COPN: "26207","o2 - de" 
+COPN: "26208","o2 - de" 




+COPN: "26801","vodafone P" 
+COPN: "26801","vodafone P" 
+COPN: "26803","P OPTIMUS" 
+COPN: "26803","P OPTIMUS" 
+COPN: "26806","P TMN" 
+COPN: "26806","P TMN" 
+COPN: "26806","P TMN" 
+COPN: "27001","L LUXGSM" 
+COPN: "27001","L LUXGSM" 
+COPN: "27077","L TANGO" 
+COPN: "27077","L TANGO" 
+COPN: "27099","L Orange-LU" 
+COPN: "27099","L Orange-LU" 
+COPN: "27099","L Orange-LU" 
+COPN: "27201","vodafone IE" 
+COPN: "27201","vodafone IE" 
+COPN: "27202","o2 IRL" 
+COPN: "27202","o2 IRL" 
+COPN: "27202","o2 IRL" 
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+COPN: "27203","IRL - METEOR"















+COPN: "27601","AMC - AL"













































































+COPN: "30272","CAN Rogers 
Wireless Inc." 


















+COPN: "302720","Rogers Wireless" 
+COPN: "302720","Rogers Wireless" 






+COPN: "30801","SPM AMERIS" 
+COPN: "310000","NEP Wireless" 
+COPN: "310002","NEP Wireless" 
+COPN: "310009","NEP Wireless" 
+COPN: "31020","US - Union 
Telephone" 
+COPN: "310020","US - Union 
Telephone" 
+COPN: "310026","T-Mobile" 





+COPN: "31040","Cellular One" 
+COPN: "310040","Cellular One" 







+COPN: "310077","Iowa Wireless 
USA" 
+COPN: "31080","Corr Wireless" 





+COPN: "310100","US PLATEAU" 
+COPN: "310100","US PLATEAU" 
+COPN: "310100","US PLATEAU" 
+COPN: "310120","Sprint" 
+COPN: "310120","Sprint" 
+COPN: "310140","GTA Mpulse" 
+COPN: "310140","GTA Mpulse" 











+COPN: "310180","West Central 
Wireless" 
+COPN: "310180","West Central 
Wireless" 
+COPN: "310190","USA Dutch Harbor" 






















+COPN: "310320","USA - CellularOne" 
+COPN: "310320","USA - CellularOne" 
+COPN: "310330","Cellular One" 
+COPN: "310330","Cellular One" 
+COPN: "310340","WestLink Comm" 
+COPN: "310340","WestLink" 
+COPN: "310350","Carolina Phone" 












+COPN: "310420","Cincinnati Bell 
Wireless" 
+COPN: "310420","Cincinnati Bell 
Wireless" 
+COPN: "310450","Cell One of NE 
Colorado" 
+COPN: "310450","Viaero Wireless" 
+COPN: "310460","USA1L" 
+COPN: "310470","USA DOCOMO 
PACIFIC" 




+COPN: "310530","West Virginia 
Wireless" 













+COPN: "310630","AmeriLink PCS" 
+COPN: "310630","USA AmeriLink" 
+COPN: "310640","Einstein PCS" 




+COPN: "310670","Wireless 2000 PCS" 





+COPN: "310690","Immix Wireless" 
+COPN: "310690","USA - Immix 
Wireless" 
+COPN: "310700","USABIGFOOT" 
+COPN: "310710","USA ASTAC" 
+COPN: "310730","U.S.Cellular" 




+COPN: "310770","i wireless" 
+COPN: "310770","Iowa Wireless 
USA" 
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+COPN: "310780","AirLink PCS" 









+COPN: "310900","Texas Cellular" 





+COPN: "31100","Wilkes USA" 
+COPN: "311000","USA Mid-Tex 
Cellular, Lt" 
+COPN: "31101","Wilkes USA" 
+COPN: "31105","Wilkes USA" 
+COPN: "311030","Indigo" 
+COPN: "31130","Indigo" 
+COPN: "31140","USA - Commnet" 
+COPN: "311040","USA - Commnet" 
+COPN: "31170","USAEC" 
+COPN: "31173","USA Proximiti" 
+COPN: "31180","Pine Cellular" 
+COPN: "311090","USASXLP" 
+COPN: "311110","High Plains" 


















+COPN: "311250","USA i CAN" 
+COPN: "311260","SLO Cellular" 
+COPN: "311310","Lamar Cellular" 
+COPN: "311311","USANCW" 
+COPN: "311330","BTW" 











+COPN: "311540","USA Proximiti" 
+COPN: "311680","GreenFly" 
+COPN: "311710","Northeast Wireless" 
+COPN: "311720","MainePCS" 
+COPN: "311730","USA Proximiti" 
+COPN: "311940","CLEAR" 
+COPN: "312060","CoverageCo" 
+COPN: "330110","PR Claro" 
+COPN: "330110","PR Claro" 
+COPN: "33211","Blue Sky" 
+COPN: "332011","Blue Sky" 
+COPN: "334003","movistar" 
+COPN: "33409","Nextel 3G" 




+COPN: "33450","Iusacell GSM" 
+COPN: "334050","Iusacell GSM" 


















+COPN: "34430","APUA PCS 
ANTIGUA" 






+COPN: "348570","CCT Boatphone" 
+COPN: "348570","CCT Boatphone" 
+COPN: "350000","CELLONE" 
+COPN: "35000","CELLONE" 
+COPN: "35002","M3 WIRELESS" 
















+COPN: "36251","Telcell GSM" 
+COPN: "36269","ANT CURACAO 
TELECOM GSM" 
+COPN: "36269","ANT CURACAO 
TELECOM GSM" 
+COPN: "36291","ANT" 
+COPN: "36301","SETAR GSM" 













+COPN: "37002","CLARO DOM" 
+COPN: "370002","CLARO DOM" 






+COPN: "376350","IslandCom TCI" 
+COPN: "376350","IslandCom TCI" 
+COPN: "376352","IslandCom TCI" 
+COPN: "376360","IslandCom TCI" 
+COPN: "40001","AZE - AZERCELL 
GSM" 
+COPN: "40001","AZE - AZERCELL 
GSM" 
+COPN: "40002","BAKCELL- AZ" 
+COPN: "40002","BAKCELL - AZ" 
+COPN: "40002","BAKCELL - AZ" 
+COPN: "40004","AZ Nar" 
+COPN: "40004","AZ Nar" 
+COPN: "40101","Beeline KZ" 
+COPN: "40102","KZ KCELL" 
+COPN: "40177","NEO-KZ" 
+COPN: "40211","BT B-Mobile" 
+COPN: "40277","TASHICELL" 
+COPN: "40277","TASHICELL" 
+COPN: "40401","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40402","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40403","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40404","IDEA" 
124 
+COPN: "40405","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40407","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40409","Reliance" 
+COPN: "40410","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40411","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40411","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40412","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40413","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40414","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40415","Vodafone IN" 





+COPN: "40420","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40420","Vodafone IN" 










+COPN: "40430","Vodafone IN" 










+COPN: "40440","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40441","AIRCEL" 
+COPN: "40442","AIRCEL" 
+COPN: "40443","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40444","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40445","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40446","Vodafone IN" 
































+COPN: "40484","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40485","Reliance" 
+COPN: "40486","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40487","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40488","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40489","IDEA" 
+COPN: "40490","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40491","Aircel" 
+COPN: "40492","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40493","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40494","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40495","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40496","IND airtel" 
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+COPN: "40497","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40498","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40500","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40501","Reliance" 














+COPN: "40525","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40527","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40529","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40530","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40531","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40532","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40534","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40535","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40536","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40537","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40538","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40539","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40541","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40542","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40543","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40544","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40545","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40546","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40547","TATA DOCOMO" 
+COPN: "40550","Reliance" 
+COPN: "40551","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40552","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40553","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40554","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40555","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40556","IND airtel" 
+COPN: "40566","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40567","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "40570","IDEA" 
+COPN: "405750","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "405751","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "405752","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "405753","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "405754","Vodafone IN" 
+COPN: "405755","Vodafone IN" 















+COPN: "405813","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405814","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405815","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405816","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405817","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405818","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405819","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405820","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405821","IN UNITECH" 






























+COPN: "405854","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405855","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405856","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405857","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405858","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405859","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405860","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405861","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405862","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405863","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405864","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405865","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405866","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405867","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405868","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405869","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405870","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405871","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405872","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405873","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405874","IN Loop" 
+COPN: "405875","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405876","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405877","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405878","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405879","IN UNITECH" 














+COPN: "405925","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405926","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405927","IN UNITECH" 
+COPN: "405928","IN UNITECH" 





+COPN: "41006","Telenor PK" 
+COPN: "41006","Telenor PK" 
+COPN: "41007","WaridTel" 
+COPN: "41007","WaridTel" 
+COPN: "41201","AF AWCC" 
+COPN: "41201","AF AWCC" 
+COPN: "41220","ROSHAN" 
+COPN: "41240","MTN AF" 
+COPN: "41240","MTN AF" 
+COPN: "41250","Etisalat Af" 
+COPN: "41250","Etisalat Af" 
+COPN: "41301","Mobitel" 
+COPN: "41302","SRI DIALOG" 
+COPN: "41302","SRI DIALOG" 
+COPN: "41303","SRI Etisalat" 
+COPN: "41303","SRI Etisalat" 
+COPN: "41305","SRI airtel" 
+COPN: "41305","SRI AIRTEL" 
+COPN: "41305","SRI AIRTEL" 
+COPN: "41308","Hutch" 
+COPN: "41308","Hutch" 
+COPN: "41401","MM 900" 
+COPN: "41501","alfa" 






























































+COPN: "42701","Qat - Qtel"






























+COPN: "43407","UZB MTS" 







+COPN: "43603","MegaFon TJK" 
+COPN: "43603","MegaFon TJK" 
+COPN: "43603","MegaFon TJK" 
+COPN: "43604","Babilon-M" 
+COPN: "43605","BEELINE TJ" 
+COPN: "43605","BEELINE TJ" 
+COPN: "43612","INDIGO-3G" 
+COPN: "43701","Beeline KG" 
+COPN: "43701","Beeline KG" 





+COPN: "43801","MTS TM" 
+COPN: "43801","MTS TM" 
+COPN: "43802","TM CELL" 
+COPN: "43802","TM CELL" 
+COPN: "44000","EMOBILE" 
+COPN: "44000","EMOBILE" 




+COPN: "45005","KOR SK Telecom" 
+COPN: "45006","KOR LG Uplus" 
+COPN: "45008","KT" 
+COPN: "45201","VN MobiFone" 
+COPN: "45201","VN MobiFone" 
+COPN: "45201","VN MobiFone" 
+COPN: "45202","VN VINAPHONE" 
+COPN: "45204","VIETTEL" 
+COPN: "45204","VNM and 
VIETTEL" 
+COPN: "45204","VNM and 
VIETTEL" 







+COPN: "45403","3 HK" 
+COPN: "45404","3(2G)" 
+COPN: "45404","3(2G)" 
+COPN: "45406","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45406","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45406","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45410","CSL" 
+COPN: "45412","China Mobile HK" 
+COPN: "45415","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45415","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45415","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45416","PCCW" 
+COPN: "45417","SmarTone HK" 
+COPN: "45417","SmarTone HK" 





+COPN: "45500","SmarTone MAC" 
+COPN: "45500","SmarTone MAC" 
+COPN: "45501","CTM" 
+COPN: "45501","CTM" 
+COPN: "45503","3 Macau" 
+COPN: "45503","3 Macau" 
+COPN: "45503","3 Macau" 
+COPN: "45504","CTM" 
+COPN: "45505","3 Macau" 
+COPN: "45601","MOBITEL - KHM" 
+COPN: "45602","Hello Axiata" 
+COPN: "45602","Hello Axiata" 











+COPN: "45609","Beeline KH" 
+COPN: "45609","Beeline KH" 
+COPN: "45618","Mfone" 
+COPN: "45618","Mfone" 
+COPN: "45701","LAO GSM" 




+COPN: "45708","TIGO LAO" 
+COPN: "45708","TIGO LAO" 




+COPN: "46601","Far EasTone" 




+COPN: "46692","Chunghwa Telecom" 
+COPN: "46692","Chunghwa Telecom" 
+COPN: "46692","Chunghwa Telecom" 
+COPN: "46693","TWN MOBITAI" 
+COPN: "46697","TW Mobile" 
+COPN: "46699","TWN TransAsia 
Telecom GS" 




+COPN: "47002","BGD ROBI 
AXIATA " 
+COPN: "47003","Banglalink" 
+COPN: "47004","BGD bMobile" 
+COPN: "47007","airtel" 





+COPN: "50212","MY MAXIS" 
+COPN: "50212","MY MAXIS" 
+COPN: "50213","MY CELCOM 3G" 
+COPN: "50216","DiGi" 
+COPN: "50218","U MOBILE" 
+COPN: "50219","MY CELCOM" 
+COPN: "50501","Telstra Mobile" 
+COPN: "50501","Telstra Mobile" 
+COPN: "50502","YES OPTUS" 
+COPN: "50502","YES OPTUS" 
+COPN: "50503","vodafone AU" 
+COPN: "50503","vodafone AU" 
+COPN: "50506","3TELSTRA" 
+COPN: "50510","Norfolk Telecom" 
+COPN: "51000","ACeS" 
+COPN: "51001","IND INDOSAT" 
+COPN: "51001","IND INDOSAT" 
+COPN: "51008","AXIS" 
+COPN: "51008","AXIS" 
+COPN: "51010","IND TELKOMSEL" 
+COPN: "51010","IND TELKOMSEL" 
+COPN: "51011","IND XL" 
+COPN: "51011","IND XL" 





+COPN: "51502","Globe Telecom-PH" 
+COPN: "51502","Globe Telecom-PH" 
+COPN: "51503","SMART" 
+COPN: "51503","SMART" 
+COPN: "51505","PH Sun Cellular" 
+COPN: "51505","PH Sun Cellular" 
+COPN: "51511","ACeS" 
+COPN: "51518","CURE" 
+COPN: "52000","TH 3G+" 
+COPN: "52001","TH GSM" 
+COPN: "52015","TOT3G" 
+COPN: "520015","TH ACT 1900" 
+COPN: "52018","TH-DTAC" 
+COPN: "52020","ACeS" 




+COPN: "52501","4G SingTel" 
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+COPN: "52502","SingTel-G18" 
+COPN: "52503","SGP - M1" 





+COPN: "52507","SGP Call Zone" 
+COPN: "52802","b-mobile" 
+COPN: "52811","BRU-DSTCom" 
+COPN: "53001","vodafone NZ" 
+COPN: "53005","Telecom NZ" 






+COPN: "53988","Digicel  Tonga" 




+COPN: "54101","VUT SMILE" 
+COPN: "54105","Digicel" 
+COPN: "54105","Digicel" 









+COPN: "544544","Blue Sky 
Communications" 
+COPN: "54509","KL-Frigate" 
+COPN: "54601","NCL MOBILIS" 
+COPN: "54720","F-VINI" 








+COPN: "60201","EGY MobiNiL" 




+COPN: "60301","ALG Mobilis" 
+COPN: "60301","ALG Mobilis" 
+COPN: "60302","Djezzy" 
+COPN: "60302","Djezzy" 
+COPN: "60303","DZA NEDJMA" 
+COPN: "60303","DZA NEDJMA" 
+COPN: "60400","MOR MEDITEL" 
+COPN: "60401","MOR IAM" 
+COPN: "60401","MOR IAM" 













+COPN: "60703","GM COMIUM" 
+COPN: "60703","GM COMIUM" 
+COPN: "60704","Qcell" 
+COPN: "60704","Qcell" 
+COPN: "60801","SN ALIZE" 
+COPN: "60802","SN-SENTEL SG" 
+COPN: "60803","SEN expresso" 
+COPN: "60803","SEN expresso" 
+COPN: "60901","MR MATTEL" 
+COPN: "60902","MR Expresso" 
+COPN: "60902","MR Expresso" 
+COPN: "60902","MR Expresso" 
+COPN: "60910","MAURITEL" 
+COPN: "61001","MALITEL ML" 
+COPN: "61002","ORANGE ML" 
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+COPN: "61101","Orange GN" 
+COPN: "61101","Orange GN" 






+COPN: "61202","ETISALAT CI" 
+COPN: "61202","ETISALAT CI" 
+COPN: "61203","Orange CI" 
+COPN: "61204","KoZ" 
+COPN: "61204","KoZ" 
+COPN: "61205","MTN CI" 
+COPN: "61302","BF Celtel" 
+COPN: "61402","CELTEL" 
+COPN: "61403","ETISALAT NER" 
+COPN: "61404","Orange NE" 
+COPN: "61404","Orange NE" 
+COPN: "61501","TG-TOGO CELL" 
+COPN: "61503","ETISALAT TOGO" 
+COPN: "61602","ETISALAT BENIN" 
+COPN: "61603","MTN BENIN" 
+COPN: "61603","MTN BENIN" 
+COPN: "61604","BELL BENIN 
COMMUNICATION" 







+COPN: "61801","LBR Lonestar Cell" 
+COPN: "61807","Celcom GSM" 
+COPN: "61807","Celcom GSM" 
+COPN: "61901","CELTEL SL" 
+COPN: "61902","MILLICOM SL" 
+COPN: "61907","GreenN SL" 
+COPN: "61907","GreenN SL" 
+COPN: "62001","GH MTN" 
+COPN: "62002","GH Vodafone" 
+COPN: "62003","tiGO" 
+COPN: "62006","Airtel GH" 
+COPN: "62006","Airtel GH" 
+COPN: "620620","Glo Ghana" 
+COPN: "620620","Glo Ghana" 
+COPN: "62120","AirtelNG" 
+COPN: "62120","AirtelNG" 
+COPN: "62130","MTN - NG" 
+COPN: "62130","MTN - NG" 
+COPN: "62140","NG Mtel" 
+COPN: "62140","NG Mtel" 
+COPN: "62150","Glo NG" 
+COPN: "62150","Glo NG" 
+COPN: "62160","EMTS NGA" 
+COPN: "62160","EMTS NGA" 
+COPN: "62201","CELTEL TCD" 
+COPN: "62301","ETISALAT RCA" 
+COPN: "62302","Telecel" 
+COPN: "62304","NationLink" 
+COPN: "62401","MTN CAM" 
+COPN: "62402","Orange CAM" 
+COPN: "62501","CPV MOVEL" 
+COPN: "62501","CPV MOVEL" 
+COPN: "62502","CPV T+" 
+COPN: "62502","CPV T+" 





+COPN: "62802","ETISALAT GAB" 
+COPN: "62803","ZAIN GA" 
+COPN: "62901","CELTEL" 
+COPN: "62902","AZUR COG" 
+COPN: "62902","AZUR COG" 
+COPN: "63005","SCELL CD" 
+COPN: "63005","SCELL CD" 
+COPN: "62907","WARID RC" 
+COPN: "62907","WARID RC" 
+COPN: "62910","COG MTN" 
+COPN: "63001","VODACOM CD" 
+COPN: "63001","VODACOM CD" 
+COPN: "63002","CELTEL DRC" 
+COPN: "63005","SCELL CD" 
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SUPPLEMENTALS: NETWORK TESTING ARCHIVES AND 
ATTACK VECTOR TAXONOMY  
This supplemental material contains an archive of each network test. The archive 
includes packet captures, configuration files, and log files for each test. Appendix G serves 
as a guide for the network set-up for each test and the file structure for the packet captures 
and log files. The material can be accessed at https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/67451. 
This supplemental material contains a reprint of material originally published in the 
IEEE Computer magazine for the convenience of the reader. The article presents a novel 
attack vector taxonomy that utilizes CUPS in the 5G NR architecture to provide an 
alternative method for analyzing mobile telephony attack vectors. 
Reprinted, with permission, from M. Lanoue, C. A. Bollmann, J. B. Michael, J. 
Roth, and D. Wijesekera, “An Attack Vector Taxonomy for Mobile Telephony Security 
Vulnerabilities,” in Computer, April 2021. This publication is a work of the U.S. 
government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection 
is not available for this work in the United States. IEEE will claim and protect its copyright 
in international jurisdictions where permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other 
uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for 
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or 
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